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Chapter 1:
Introduction
Free speech is a right that underpins all other rights in Western political thought.
According to the American Civil Liberties Union, “Freedom of speech, of the press, of
association, of assembly and petition -- this set of guarantees, protected by the First Amendment,
comprises what we refer to as freedom of expression. The Supreme Court has written that this
freedom is ‘the matrix, the indispensable condition of nearly every other form of freedom.’
Without it, other fundamental rights, like the right to vote, would wither and die” (“Free
Speech”). Free speech is a matrix, the cohesion that holds all other laws and rights together, the
proverbial glue of Western society. As an important hallmark of the Western political thought,
freedom of speech is arguably one of the most important aspects of Western governance.
Governance in political terminology can have a diversity of potential meanings. In the context of
freedom of speech and governance, the definition provided Hyden best explains this relationship,
as he defines governance as “the conscious management of regime structures, with a view to
enhancing the public realm” (Hyden, 7). Part of managing regime structure and the public realm
in governance is managing positive and negative rights. Positive rights are rights that a
government is expected to provide for a population, such as access to safe food, shelter, and
safety. Negative rights, like freedom of speech, are rights which governments are not supposed
to infringe upon. Actively handling these rights, especially freedom of speech, is an important
component of enhancing the public realm, especially in maintaining stability in a society.
Beyond the countries known as “the West,” governments also grapple with freedom of
speech as a governance issue. In China, for example, the concept of freedom of speech is a

4

contentious issue. Few laws in China protect freedom of speech for civilians, and these few laws
are frequently overlooked by Chinese government officials. In theory, the Chinese Constitution
asserts that Chinese citizens have freedom of speech, can speak their minds freely, and are
permitted to criticize the government. Under Chapter II: the Fundamental Rights and Duties of
Citizens, Article 35 of the Chinese Constitution states that “Citizens of the People's Republic of
China enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession and of
demonstration” (Constitution of the People’s Republic of China). In practice, the Chinese
propaganda regime and massive Internet surveillance system heavily restrict free speech. The
West criticizes China for this hypocrisy frequently, often with some degree of moral superiority.
Freedom of speech is a politically complex subject for governance. When ruling a nation,
governments seeking to maintain sovereignty risk a great deal by allowing citizens to dissent, to
voice their opinions. Revolutions begin, coup d’états occur, and politicians lose their control of
the government if dissent grows beyond the breaking point. However, silencing speech in some
situations can create even more instability than allowing dissent to occur. Restricting freedom of
speech risks the citizens fomenting dissent privately. This inherent struggle of when to allow
speech and when to silence it is at the crux of governing freedom of speech. It may be surprising
for some to hear that “freedom of speech” is governed. After all, in the West, free speech is
conceptualized as the absence of government in our speech, the permission to say essentially
what is on our minds, unfettered by government control. Yet, in Europe, America, and China,
there are legacies of political theory which dictate how and why governments allow freedom of
speech, under what situations speech is and is not permissible.
China, the United States, and the European Union share one fundamental governance
concept on freedom of speech: all three control freedom of speech when the motivations for
5

restricting it protect the governments’ long-term interests. In other words, freedom of speech
does different governance work for different regimes. Contrary to our conventional notions of
freedom of speech as simply an index for citizen liberties, where more freedom of speech
equates to more power for citizens in the governance process, this thesis highlights the different
ways in which freedom of speech is a political tool of power for governments, where freedom of
expression enables government control of the population. There is a conception that the more
freedom of speech a country has, the more free the people are; that is not the case. By taking
three very different regime types with three different approaches to freedom of speech, it is
possible to examine this complex relationship between freedom of speech and governance.
Readers in the West may contest the allegation that Western governments control
freedom of speech. While the US and the EU do not implement the same governance model for
controlling speech as the Chinese government does, these Western governments do control
freedom of speech, albeit using different methods. The Chinese government controls freedom of
speech by silencing dissent when the speech calls into question the legitimacy of the Chinese
Communist Party’s central initiatives relating to economic progress. The US and the EU have
similar control tactics that are more complex than simply silencing dissent; after all, in the West,
citizens will not tolerate such governance methods. Instead, the EU and US governments control
freedom of speech by manipulating the discourse surrounding important government initiatives
such that citizens can protest incessantly, but the legislation or initiative will still pass into law.
The EU and the US share two common governance tactics for controlling the discourse, and thus
controlling free speech. First, in the Internet age, governments use social media to both collect
public opinion and to disseminate the government’s discourse on a given issue. Second, if the
government fails to convince the population of an initiative’s merits, there are governance tactics,
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like seeking judicial oversight or redrafting legislation to conceal the original initiative, which
allow the government to achieve its original goal.
Freedom of speech is a right guaranteed by the US, the EU, and China; however, just
because a right is guaranteed does not mean the government cannot manipulate the right to
achieve its ends. Freedom of speech is commonly associated with the power of language;
citizens speak in order to take control of those governing them, in order to assert their desires. In
reality, freedom of speech is far more beneficial for governments, who can use this dissent to
better control a population. In order to control the population, though, the governments must first
control the dissenting speech, the discourse, surrounding an issue. In the case studies that follow,
these three governments with very different regimes will manipulate discourses elicited in the
name of free speech in order to advance the governments’ plans, even when these plans went
against the stated public interest and ignored the dissenting citizens. This thesis, in essence,
examines how freedom of speech can become a tool of power for regimes.
The West: Freedom of Speech as Power for Regimes
There is a notion in Western political theory that free speech is a means for the people to
monitor and protest against the government, hence the phraseology of “freedom of speech.”
Theorists like John Stuart Mill and John Locke were the first great proponents of individual
freedoms. Locke’s main contribution to the notion of freedom of speech was his development of
the notion that individuals have rights. Locke established the individual as an actor in his Second
Treatise of Government. From here, he builds his theory of the individual’s right to “life, liberty,
property, and the pursuit of happiness.”
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Building on Locke’s notion of individual rights, Mill is one of the first major defendants
of freedom of speech. He observes that allowing freedom of speech allows for the citizen to
choose freely between ideas, to be more fully informed.
“I choose, by preference the cases which are least favourable to me – In
which the argument against freedom of opinion, both on truth and that of utility, is
considered the strongest. Let the opinions impugned be the belief of God and in a
future state, or any of the commonly received doctrines of morality... But I must
be permitted to observe that it is not the feeling sure of a doctrine (be it what it
may) which I call an assumption of infallibility. It is the undertaking to decide
that question for others, without allowing them to hear what can be said on the
contrary side.”

Mill argues that freedom of speech is a critical component to facilitate societal
interactions and to have meaningful discussion, both underpinnings of liberal democracy and
general civil society. Essentially, Mill argues that truth destroys falsity; therefore, all speech goes
towards finding truth by reconciling the perspectives of multiple actors. As such, it is clearly to
the benefit of society to have uninhibited speech, as this method will destroy false claims faster
than a society with censorship that perpetuates false notions.
However, even Mill cannot accept unlimited free speech. Mill adds the first limitation to
free speech in the same work that creates the concept. In On Liberty, Mill sets the standard of
freedom of speech as anything that can and should be said, no matter how insulting or
controversial, he says: "there ought to exist the fullest liberty of professing and discussing, as a
matter of ethical conviction, any doctrine, however immoral it may be considered." The only
time this sort of language can be hindered is if it violates what Mill terms “the harm principle”,
which is that "the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of
a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others." In essence, according to
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Mill and subsequent scholarship, this principle means physical harm is grounds for limiting free
speech.
In 1985, Joel Feinberg added to the Millian notion of the harm principle with the offense
principle. Feinberg argues that the harm principle does not provide enough protection for the
behavior of others that could cause psychological harm to surrounding citizens. His contribution
to help complete the harm principle, the offense principle, states that, “It is always a good reason
in support of a proposed criminal prohibition that it would probably be an effective way of
preventing serious offense (as opposed to injury or harm) to persons other than the actor, and that
it is probably a necessary means to that end” (Feinberg). Feinberg takes the term “offense” to
mean “the subjective element” that “consists in the experience of an unpleasant mental state (for
example, shame, disgust, anxiety, embarrassment); the objective element consists in the
existence of a wrongful cause of such a mental state” (“Law, Philosophy”). From these basics of
freedom of speech, the harm and offense principles, Western liberal democracy has built what is
known as “freedom of speech.” In essence, speech is only limited when it is harmful to others.
However, harmful can become problematic to define. The First Amendment of the United
States Constitution reads “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.” Not included in the wording of the First Amendment are the exceptions to the First
Amendment, types of speech that qualify as harmful, which include hate speech, obscenity,
pornography, and other forms of speech that could be deemed harmful to individuals.
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The trouble with these limitations on free speech is that the government can take these
limitations to restrict individuals from commenting on or protesting against the government.
Several acts of Congress have made acting against the US government’s interest illegal, despite
the protections provided to citizens by the First Amendment. The Espionage Act of 1917
imposed a twenty year sentence on anyone who exhibited "insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny,
or refusal of duty in the military or naval forces of the United States ("People & Events: Prelude
to the Red Scare”). The Sedition Act of 1918 made "disloyal," "scurrilous" or "abusive" language
against the government illegal ("People & Events: Prelude to the Red Scare”). None of these acts
directly involved the safety of one individual; rather, the logic behind these laws is that the
collective safety of the public was in jeopardy, which brings the relevant question: how far can
the government take this claim towards public safety as a means of hindering free speech? And
what does this issue tell us about why a government allows free speech at all?
China and Freedom of Speech
While Article 35 in the Chinese Constitution protects freedom of speech, the Chinese
Communist Party does not have a strong legacy of enforcing this article. The Chinese
government has a well-known reputation for acts preventing freedom of speech within its
borders. The Mao era marked perhaps the height of suppression of freedom of speech in China.
Starting with the Anti-Rightist Movement, Mao set the stage for massive oppression of free
speech in China. The Anti-Rightist campaign was a reaction to Mao’s initial Hundred Flower’s
Movement1. In 1957, when the chairman started the campaign, it was meant to “solicit feedback
from the public.” However, there was such an out lash against the CCP that Mao felt the regime
1

The Hundred Flowers’ Movement was Mao Zedong’s reaction to the outcry of intellectuals to his policies
in the 1950s. Mao originally requested the opinions of intellectual society on his economic and political
policies. The resulting outpouring of discontent led Mao to kill and silence thousands of dissenters in what
is now called the Hundred Flowers’ Movement.
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was being called into question. Thus, he waited several weeks to “lure the snakes out,” to allow
more intellectuals and dissidents to show their colors, and then “in early June he launched a
systematic attack in the form of the Anti-Rightist campaign against those who has spoken out”
(Joseph 75). Those labeled “rightists” were sent to the countryside to reform through labor.
Far more devastating on both the population of China and the survival of free speech was
the Cultural Revolution. The Revolution officially occurred from mid-1966 to 1968, but the
effect on the society was so devastating that this period is referred to as the “Cultural Revolution
decade”, spanning from 1966 to 1976 (Joseph 83). The goal of the Cultural Revolution was to
reinvigorate the revolutionary spirit of the youth of China, while also removing the “Four Olds”
(sì jiù 四旧) from Chinese society: Old Customs, Old Culture, Old Habits, and Old Ideas. In
essence, Mao inspired the Chinese youth to revolt against their teachers and parents, and to go in
search of the Four Olds and destroy everything that appeared to embrace an old concept. These
youth formed what became known as the Red Guard, and these motley troops of teenagers
ransacked temples, burned houses of those with a bad class background, and assaulted and killed
intellectuals, capitalists, foreigners, and anyone who did not firmly uphold the Mao ideology.
The official “cleansing of class ranks” campaign occurred from 1968 to 1969, and combined
with further suppressive killings from 1970-1972, killed in total roughly 1.5 million people
(Joseph 88). During this period, free speech was “allowed,” if by allowed one means “you may
espouse one and only one ideology, or die.” In essence, divergence of thought in any way, shape,
or form became a death sentence. This period marked the height of oppression of freedom of
speech in modern Chinese history.
After the end of the Cultural Revolution, the Party line was still the only opinion tolerated
and deemed valid, and even higher-ups in the Chinese Communist Party had to abide by the
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strict rules of obedience to the Mao ideology. Freedom of speech was not a concept in Maoist era
China, and even after Mao died, deviation from the Party line was cause for imprisonment. PostMao, freedom of speech was expanded slightly, wherein it was no longer as punishable to speak
one’s political views, so long as they did not directly challenge Party doctrine.
However, perhaps the best known single act of oppression of freedom of speech by the
government was the Tiananmen Square Massacre in 1989, where over a million protestors
gathered in Tiananmen Square in Beijing to protest the government. This crackdown occurred
under the regime governed by Deng Xiaoping. The protests began on April 15th, 1989 as a mass
mourning over the death of former CPC General Secretary Hu Yaobang, who had been removed
from government due to his support for political liberalization of the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP). On the day of Hu's funeral, over 100,000 people had gathered at Tiananmen Square.
What started as a mass mourning was transformed by students into a movement for further
political liberalization and economic reform, pushing for a more aggressive transformation of
economy and state. What started as 100,000 protestors turned into over a million people gathered
in Tiananmen Square and expanding into surrounding streets. Other non-violent protests were
also simultaneously occurring in major cities throughout China, including Shanghai and Wuhan.
The primarily non-violent nature of the movement makes it a case of civil resistance. This public
protest to demand for democracy (minzhu 民主) was not well-received by the Chinese
government, who did not want to hear the grievances of this motley assortment of students,
workers, and peasants. By the end of a month and a half of protest, the government dispatched
the army to fire upon the protestors. Premier Li Peng, a hardline conservative, declared martial
law on May 20th and executed it on June 4th, ordering the People's Liberation Army to remove
the protestors from the square. The PLA, under the orders of Deng Xiaoping, fired upon the
12

crowds to force the protestors from Tiananmen Square. The exact number of civilian deaths is
not known, and the majority of estimates range from several hundred to thousands. This act of
violence led to China being shunned by the international community for almost three years.
Today, China’s government is more permissive of freedom of speech, compared to this
history of abuses. However, it still heavily restricts speech relating to government policy on
issues that relate to the governments’ key initiatives for the future. For example, criticisms of
China’s economic progress, questioning the legitimacy of the CCP’s rule, and trying to incite
rebellions have all been cause in the past for the Chinese government to censor speech. In
essence, China chooses to silence freedom of speech when the content of the speech leads to
citizens questioning the Chinese government’s ability to rule. Regime stability, for the CCP, is a
primary reason for silencing speech.
THEORIES OF GOVERNANCE AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH
A Marketplace of Ideas
In the West, the notion of governance most closely associated with freedom of speech is
the “marketplace of ideas.” This term was coined first by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in his
1919 dissent in Abrams v. United States, when he introduced it into Supreme Court doctrine.
Holmes’ argument was that society's ultimate good "is better reached by free trade in ideas - that
the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market” (Hopkins 41). Grounded in the free speech theory of John Stuart Mill, this is the model
of freedom of speech governance most commonly invoked in the United States, and it “is the
model most called upon by the U.S. Supreme Court in the resolution of free-expression cases,”
where “justices have used the theory in the adjudication of virtually every area of First
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Amendment law” (Hopkins 40). Essentially, the modern argument goes that the reason
governments suffer the potential harms involved with letting citizens speak their mind is that
these ideas can create a marketplace, both intellectual and economic, which will feed the nation.
In countries like China, this idea also holds traction. During the 1990s, when Deng
Xiaoping was re-opening and revolutionizing the Chinese economy post-Tiananmen Square, the
Internet was also being introduced into China. From the beginning, the Internet was seen as a
potentially strong economic actor, although it wasn’t until the late ‘90s that it became clear
exactly how lucrative the Internet could be when utilized. One of the reasons proposed for why
China allows some degree of freedom of speech and access to the Internet is precisely because
this modicum of freedom can provide large economic benefits. For example, Alibaba is currently
one of China’s most successful business enterprises, and this company focuses the majority of its
economic activities in the business-to-business sector online. The company had an initial public
offering on the Hong Kong stock market for 1.5 billion dollars, making it one of China’s most
successful IPOs (Einhorn). However, the marketplace of ideas model does not explain why
governments allow for people to make statements against the central governmental authority,
statements which have no potential to mobilize intellectual or market forces. Two other models,
the safety valve and the surveillance method, give greater insight into the potential reasons the
government allows citizens to protest the government’s actions that do not have direct links to
economic activity.
The Safety Valve
The concept of the safety valve is central in how freedom of speech is conceived as a tool
in governance. Thomas Emerson, professor at the Yale Law School and First Amendment
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scholar, first coined the term “safety valve” in relation to free speech. He asserted that freedom
of speech acted as important agent of regime stability by allowing citizens to air grievances in
non-violent fashions. Also, this freedom of speech acted as an important feedback mechanism
for the government, who can listen to the people’s complaints and respond to them through
policy changes (Lipschultz 52). This notion of freedom of speech as a safety valve has
implications for how the US, the EU, China, and other governments can view freedom of speech
not as a just a right of citizens, but as a tool of governance.
This safety valve theory ties in with social contract theory, in that the safety valve model
relies on the notion of mutual benefit, which states that citizens give up some autonomy in order
to gain other rights. The three main theorists of social contract theory, John Locke, Thomas
Hobbes, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, all approach this theory through a different lens. John
Locke asserts in his Second Treatise of Government that the people would live in peace in nature,
but individuals choose to cede some of their power to the government so that they may be
shielded from aggressors who might take their goods. Hobbes has a very different claim, that the
humans are inherently born into chaos, and that people sacrifice certain freedoms to the
government for some semblance of stability and thus the ability to sustain growth of a society.
According to Hobbes, man in nature has claim to everything, including “one anothers body,” and
so long as that is true, man can act in violence against other man, and “there can be no security to
any man, (how strong or wise soever he be)” (Hobbes 107). Laying out this theory in his seminal
work, The Leviathan, Hobbes asserts that the government and the people forge a social contract
to maintain the protection of the people and the power of the government.
Rousseau further adds to this literature with his Du Contract Social, in which he asserts
that man has a more familial relationship with society and has freedoms which cannot be ceded:
15

“To renounce one’s freedom is to renounce one’s quality as man, the rights of humanity, and
even its duties…such a renunciation is incompatible with the nature of man.” (Rousseau 45).
Rousseau notes that people enter into a “social pact,” wherein there is a “form of association that
will defend and protect the person and goods of each association with the full common force, and
by means of which each, uniting with all, nevertheless obey only himself and remain as free as
before.” (Rousseau 49-50). Rousseau argues people band together to protect these sacred rights
and freedoms, creating a collective, cohesive social contract in communal pursuit of defending
rights. These three frameworks help create the notion of the social contract that describes the
relationship between governments and their citizens whom they serve.
Inherent in all of these theories is the presence of communication between the
government and the people. Be it through elections, referendums, or the simple act of speaking,
government needs to elicit the opinion of the people if it is to adapt to the needs of its citizens.
Governments who fail to take their citizens’ evolving needs into account will be in violation of
the social contract, and risk being overthrown. Hence, the safety valve has two purposes: to
allow the citizens to vent frustration non-violently, and for the government to hear the grievances
of the people.
However, this second benefit of the safety valve, allowing the government to understand
the needs of the people, can be optimized through surveillance. Simply waiting for the people to
accumulate frustration to the point of protesting is a game of chance. After all, if the government
is not monitoring the people’s reactions to policy changes, the frustration of the people may not
be sufficiently vented through the safety valve, and thus violence may still occur. Most
governments thus employ a second method of interacting with their people to keep the social
contract alive: surveillance.
16

The Surveillance Method
A long tradition of political theory has observed that states structure themselves to better
watch their citizens. Political theory on government control states that governments create
societies that foster communal actions by having strict rules and guidelines for behavior,
enforced by government surveillance and interference in daily lives. John Bentham’s Panopticon
is perhaps one of the best examples of this model of governance. The panopticon is a building
designed to allow an observer to watch everyone in an institution without the observed knowing
they are being watched. His original design comprised a circular structure with an "inspection
house" at its center, with the observed sitting in the perimeter of the building. Bentham originally
conceived this sort of building as being useful in hospitals, schools, insane asylums and, most
famously, prisons.
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Bentham’s Panopticon, realized by a state penitentiary2
Michel Foucault builds upon the panopticon model in his work Discipline and Punish,
where he says this is not just a building design, but rather a societal structure and model for
governance. Foucault argues that the panopticon is a metaphor for modern "disciplinary"
societies, which have an intense need to use surveillance to control their populations by creating
the societal framework such that people are rewarded for policing and self-regulating their own
behavior, with no violent intervention needed by the state to enforce compliance. Foucault takes
Bentham’s physical structure and analyses how this design is also a social one. In essence,
Foucault argues the panopticon has come to define government relations with societies, wherein
the government observes and controls the civilian population, always watching but never overtly
“seen” by the people, who merely feel the moral implications of the government’s gaze but
cannot place the government as the observer.
Foucault’s Discipline and Punish begins with him describing the end of corporal
punishment as the tried and true method of punishing, and how torture as punishment has moved
from the public square into privacy, and from physical punishment to societal exclusion and
mental torture. From here, he progresses to say that even as punishment has become a hidden
part of the penal process, the effectiveness of punishment is still due to the punishment’s
inevitability (Foucault 11). Now, it is the conviction itself, rather than the violent punishment,
which stigmatizes the offender (Foucault 16).

2

http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_KDKHSAy2hEw/TIhXEdYDX3I/AAAAAAAAAY4/d5RKD97qbS8/s1600/large.p
anopticon.jpg
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From here, Foucault further builds how societies create these social punishments within
the framework of the Panopticon. Here, the society itself creates a system where the citizens can
all watch each other, and everyone opts into this system willingly.
There is no risk, therefore, that the increase of power created by the
panoptic machine may degenerate into tyranny; the disciplinary mechanism will
be democratically controlled, since it will be constantly accessible ‘to the great
tribunal committee of the world.’ This Panopticon, subtly arranged so that an
observer may observe, at a glance, so many different individuals, also enables
everyone to come and observe any of the observers.” (Foucault 207)

Thus, in a democratic system, as Foucault claims, people still elect to be within this
system of conformity and constant surveillance, where every citizen watches the other, and the
government watches everyone.
The question is why everyone would opt into such a social framework. For Foucault, the
answer lies in economic efficiency, the utility of obeying, and the need for constant surveillance
to make sure the society functions like a well-oiled machine.

“The Panopticon, on the other hand, has a role of amplification; although
it arranges power, although it is intended to make it more economic and more
effective, it does so not for power itself, nor for the immediate salvation of a
threatened society: its aim is to strengthen the social forces- to increase
production, to develop the economy, spread education, raise the level of public
morality; to increase and multiply.” (p. 208)

Thus, Foucault creates the narrative of societies of surveillance. However, implicit in this
analysis is the absence of true freedom of expression. As everyone is watching one another, each
is ready to silence a dissenter. As Oscar J. Handy notes in his book The Panoptic Sort, Foucault
creates the argument that panopticons are designed to normalize actors within a society, to create
19

and sustain conformity: “It is critical to note that the purpose of the modern prison and of other
panoptic system that imitate its technology is not punishment, but transformation, rehabilitation,
and correct training. The same may be said of the panoptic sort: It is not limited to identification,
classification, and assessment, but includes the goal of normalizing behavior within categories”
(Handy 24). He establishes three types of normalizing: surveillance, or hierarchical observation,
normalizing judgment, or punishing nonconformity and promoting conformity, and examination
of members. In essence, the panopticon does not allow for true free speech, or true dissent. One
must always be in line with the system, or the system will realign the dissenter.
THE INTERNET AGE
In the 21st century, the Internet has created a new, online forum in which people express
themselves, and has become the newest arena for freedom of speech to flourish. However, as the
Internet has grown as an influential medium in the EU, the US and China, these governments
have been forced to confront free speech issues on the Internet. Faced with social networks that
allow for comments to travel continents in seconds, these governments have needed to adjust
their governance model in accordance with this advancement in technology. More importantly,
the Internet allows governments to implement the surveillance model more thoroughly than in
prior eras, as people willingly post personal information to Facebook, Twitter, and other sites
which the government can access easily. At the same time, however, these governments have
been forced to confront dissent on the Internet as an influential factor in policy successes, as
thousands of citizens can galvanize dissent in cyberspace to reject government policies. Thus,
discourse control on the Internet has become an increasingly implemented governance tactic for
moderating, monitoring and manipulating speech.
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The US
Contemporary social critics frequently cite Foucault, asserting that technology has
allowed the government to better implement panoptic structures to control society and diminish
freedom of speech. Social media is perhaps the best panopticon yet. In the United States, social
networking sites are doing the panoptic work for the government. Not only are websites like
Facebook and Twitter omnipresent in society now, but they also allow citizens to opt into a
system where the government can access every level of social interaction across time and social
networks. Social media, used in conjunction with Google user search results and ISPs, allow the
government to track civilians better than ever before. Now, in the post Patriot Act era, the
government has increased abilities to watch the actions of the people.
The EU
The EU also has clauses protecting “freedom of expression,” which is quite expansive,
spanning from human rights, democratization language, to Internet usage. In terms of Internet
dissemination of information, the European Union’s “Resolution on the information society, the
management of the Internet and democracy” establishes that it is the duty of Member States “to
ensure that the new facilities are used to promote freedom of speech and information, exchanges
between cultures, education and civic participation in public life, in particular in relation to EU
enlargement or international contacts with countries whose peoples live under authoritarian and
repressive regimes” (EUR-Lex). In other words, the EU prioritizes freedom of access to
information, especially in relation to “repressive regimes.”
The EU also has the power to rule against some of the actions of member states. For
example, in 2004, the EU Parliament ruled that the Italian government’s lack of a pluralistic
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media was in violation of the freedom of expression espoused by the European Union. It also
surveyed other EU nations to determine how pluralistic their media representation was, with
varying results. Germany was found not in violation of the freedom of expression in regards to
their wiretaps of journalists: “surveillance of telecommunications (i.e. tracing of journalists'
phone calls) did not constitute a breach of constitutional liberties as provided for in articles of the
Basic Law, which guarantee confidentiality of information” (EUR-Lex). While Germany’s
surveillance taps were seen as a minor issue, Italy was cautioned that it needs to diversify its
media sources: “MEPs invited the Italian Parliament to "accelerate its work on the reform of the
audiovisual sector in accordance with the recommendations of the Italian constitutional court and
the President of the Republic, taking account of the provisions in the Gasparri bill which are
incompatible with Community law, as noted by those authorities". Parliament voiced concern
that the situation in Italy could arise in other Member States if a media magnate chose to enter
politics” (EUR-Lex). In essence, the EU does have the ability to judge the actions of its members
in regards to freedom of speech.
China
The Chinese government maintains an extensive system of media control. Between the
Propaganda Bureau that chooses how the media can portray certain events and the Fifty Cent
Party, the cohort of web watchers that the government hires to police web forums searching for
dissidents, the Chinese Communist Party has finely tuned its methods of controlling the Internet
and the media. The Propaganda Bureau and other government agencies work together to pursue
one key goal: ensuring that “netizens” of China, Chinese citizens who use the Internet, do not
turn it into a medium of protest or a mechanism for rallying political power against the state.
Ashley Esarey, Columbia University researcher and PhD candidate, is quoted as saying in Asia
22

Online Times of July 22, 2004, that "all online media [chat rooms excepted] are required to use
content provided by mainstream media. This content is subject to strict party monitoring. There
is almost no content widely accessible in China that is not monitored by the Propaganda
Department [of the communist party]," (Borton). The Propaganda Bureau determines the
mainstream content, but web forums are not mainstream content, since their content is
determined by citizens posting online. Therefore, forums are patrolled by anonymous
government officials or by members of the Fifty Cent Party, who will remove posts from web
forums, shut down forums entirely, and even go so far as to track down those who post
incendiary comments. One famous instance of how far this censorship can go was that of a
woman who called herself the “Stainless Steel Mouse” (Borton). The government tracked her
online activity for weeks before finally arresting her on counts of sedition for writing blog posts
criticizing the government. She was released after a year in prison, and has not returned to
blogging since her detainment.
Given this tight control of free speech, it seems that China’s Constitution, especially its
freedom of speech clause, is pointless. Looking at the history would indicate that the Chinese do
not value freedom of speech. Yet, if that is the case, why did Deng Xiaoping keep the free
speech clause? Is it just a lip service to liberal Western notions of “good governance”? Or is
there something about the history of China and free speech that this narrative misses? Could a
government so bent on controlling its people see a utility in keeping free speech an option for its
people?
The Chinese government needs this clause; it allows the Chinese government to better
control its population. By allowing a modicum of free speech, by allowing blogs and web forums
to exist, the Chinese government gives the illusion of the people fighting back against the
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government, when in fact, these mediums are just ways for the government to better watch the
people. This safety valve provides citizens with some ability to release their anger at the
government on web forums, a far preferable method than inciting riots in the streets or other
alternatives. However, allowing speech also has that secondary, surveillance benefit. The
Propaganda Bureau and the Fifty Cent Party, by allowing people to speak their mind on issues,
can see what the public opinion actually is before silencing it. By doing so, the government can
respond to citizen criticisms in a more effective fashion than if the government was not privy to
public opinion. In a system without elections for national office, the Chinese government needs
this connection to the minds of the Chinese people to maintain regime stability.
THESIS
The central question of this thesis addresses how governments use freedom of speech and
protest as a means of controlling a population and enhancing regime stability. As previously
established, Western notions of freedom of speech emphasize the rights of the individual to
speak, but have also established the grounds upon which a government can manipulate
discourses developed from freedom of speech, thus using free speech as a governance tool. In the
modern era, where the Internet allows for the government to monitor its citizens more closely
than ever, these regimes permit freedom of speech as a way of trapping potential dissidents, coopting their ideas when useful, and deflecting social tensions towards less threatening ends when
necessary. When examining the models of Internet governance theory, the marketplace of ideas,
the safety valve, and the surveillance model, the surveillance model is most influential in Internet
governance and freedom of speech. The US, the EU, and China all use the surveillance model as
a way of maintaining regime stability and promoting government initiatives. This thesis will
examine how China, the EU, and the US, in specific scenarios, have used the Internet as a means
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of observing civilian response to government oversight or government initiatives before turning
this discourse resulting from free speech into a method of actively maintaining regime stability
through controlling and manipulating citizen discourse.
METHODOLOGY
Discourse Analysis
In investigating my central question, I use discourse analysis as the predominant
methodology. This approach lends itself to a deeper understanding of the power dynamics that
underpin the operation of freedom of speech. Discourse analysis focuses on examining types of
discourse to uncover hidden political agendas in conversations surrounding a variety of issues.
By examining three main rhetorical methods of controlling discourse, manipulations,
propagation tactics, and memes, I will investigate how governments controlled discourse.
A discourse in academia is broadly defined as the narrative of academic thought. When
research papers are written, they are grounded in the context of the theorists who precede the
paper’s inception. For example, in a paper on discourse analysis, one must reference past
political theorists who developed the field of discourse. The field of discourse analysis dates
back to Aristotle, who laid the foundations of rhetoric through logos (logic), ethos (ethical
appeal), and pathos (emotional appeals). Michel Foucault, creator of the Panopticon as a social
construct, also first developed the field of discourse analysis in his works The Archaeology of
Knowledge, History of Sexuality, Vol. 1 and Discipline and Punish. In this thesis, pursuant to
Foucault’s post-modern definition of discourse, the case studies will examine power dynamics of
discourse, unspoken actions that frame the discourse, different actors in the discourse, in addition
to elements in the conversation of the discourse, specifically manipulation, propagation, and
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memes, to prove that the surveillance model is becoming the predominant means of controlling
free speech in China, the US, and the EU.
From Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault gives the definitions for discourse. In short,
there are two kinds of discourse that Foucault identifies; discourses in disciplines of study and in
formulation of arguments, and discourse surrounding the form of how ideas are presented. This
thesis will focus on the former, how discourses in the digital age are formed. Concerning this
kind of discourse, Foucault explains that it is what is not said that is the most important in
identifying a discourse: “all manifest discourse is secretly based on an ‘already-said’; and that
this ‘already-said’ is not merely a phrase that has already been spoken, or a text that has already
been written, but a ‘never-said’, an incorporeal discourse, a voice as silent as a breath, a writing
that is merely the hollow of its own mark…the manifest discourse, therefore, is really no more
than the repressive presence of what it does not say; and this ‘not-said’ is a hollow that
undermines from within all that is said.” (Foucault, 1972: 25). Foucault here explains that what
goes on behind the formulation of a discourse is never revealed directly in the discourse itself.
For example, in the case of ACTA, the writers of ACTA would never say, “We are writing this
agreement because copyrights are a framework to which our governments adhere; therefore, in
order to maintain our governments’ legitimacy, we must pursue copyrights as a policy issue.”
However, implicit in the ACTA agreement is this very concept; that such an obligation exists.
As Foucault states in History of Sexuality, discourses are not just the weapons of the
government; it is also the means of resistance for the people:
Discourses are not once and for all subservient to power or raised up against it,
any more than silences are. We must make allowance for the complex and
unstable process whereby discourse can be both instrument and an effect of power,
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but also hindrance, a stumbling block, a point of resistance and a starting point for
an opposition strategy (Foucault, History of Sexuality, 100-101)
I investigate how power operates in free speech regulations to allow and silence speech in
my case studies on China, the US and the EU. Civilians are often both the victims and utilizers of
discourse. When using freedom of expression and speech, civilians can take control of the
discourse, removing it from solely government control. Given the fickle nature of discourse, the
government must be wary of citizens, corporations, and other outside actors taking control of the
discourse and manipulating it against the government, hence the importance of regulating
freedom of speech.
Looking at the politics behind the discourse, behind the words being uttered, is a critical
part of this process. At times, the discourse will include what is not being said. As Foucault
frames it, discourse is fluid in this manner, moving between what can concretely be framed as
the conversation, and what occurs behind the scenes.
To be more precise, we must not imagine a world of discourse divided between
accepted discourse and excluded discourse, or between the dominant discourse
and the dominated one; but as a multiplicity of discursive elements that can come
into play in various strategies. It is this distribution that we must reconstruct, with
the things said and those concealed, the enunciations required and those forbidden,
that it comprises; with the variants and different effects… (Foucault, History of
Sexuality, 100)

As such, this thesis will be examining both words spoken and actions left outside of the
conversation. The discourse analysis will include not just the rhetoric of the statements made, but
also the context behind which the comments were discussed and actions taken that do not enter
the discourse. For example, when the government acts behind closed doors, the consequences of
said actions affects the discourse, even though words may not have been explicitly uttered.
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Additionally, this thesis will examine the nature of the actors in the discourse. As
Foucault notes, discourses are framed “according to who is speaking, his position of power, the
institutional context in which he happens to be situated” (Foucault, History of Sexuality, 100).
For this reason, this thesis will be examining issues from multiple perspectives in each case,
looking through the eyes of not just the government and the people, but also the national and
international media, and in the case of the US and EU cases, corporations for and against the acts
and agreements in question. In this way, the case studies more fully examine the aspects of the
discourse as framed by different players with different positions of power and different
institutional contexts.
In discourse analysis, the concepts of manipulation, propagation and memes are keys to
understanding the role a discourse has on the audience. As Paul Chilton notes in “Manipulation,
memes and metaphors,” in discourse analysis, propagation refers to how effectively ideas are
spread and in some cases also refers to propaganda, manipulation refers to how ideas are framed
in a way that persuades an audience, and memes are discourses framed in such a way that a
member of a society can easily identify the concept. As Chilton describes it, “Dawkin’s approach
sometimes suggests memes are blind self-replicators, transmuted by random mutation as they go
from mind to mind, he also sometimes emphasizes the idea of memetic ‘contagion’. The latter
suggests some memes in some circumstances, given certain kinds of actors, are likely to ‘spread’
more than others” (Saussare and Chilton 16). These three concepts impact how ideas spread in a
society and come to have political power.
Successfully utilizing manipulation, propagation, and memes is the key to controlling
discourse. Various factors, such as societal standing, affect an individual’s ability to utilize these
tools. As Chilton describes it, discourses are propagated with varying degrees of effectiveness.
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Mainly, the “forceful spreading of ideas, ‘propagation’, depends largely on the ability of the
propagator to control or dominate an intended receiver’s mind by controlling the channel of
communication or depriving the receiver of the potential to verify.” (Saussare and Chilton 17) In
other words, those who speak loudest in society, who are best able to disseminate their idea,
while also preventing other voices or ideas from being heard, will be the most effective at
propagation. Those occupying visible spaces in society, like politicians or other public figures,
have a wider audience of potentially interested listeners who will be manipulated into believing
and spreading an idea. Beyond the individual, groups can hold these societal positions of power
as well. In the case of corporations like Google and Wikipedia, which hold a near-monopoly on
the search engine and free encyclopedia market, their ubiquity means that their voice holds
greater weight. Not only are they highly visible to the public, but they also have the ability to
control discourse because they are the first source of information easily available to Internet
readers. In the case of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, the power of the Internet-based
corporations in propagation is particularly relevant.
In order to prove that governments allow freedom of speech in order to better control
their population, this thesis will examine a few specific protest movements. First, I will examine
the web forum interactions of netizens in China, and how their interactions directly influenced
government policy, even without ever directly speaking with a government official. I will focus
on forums with high volume of comments and visits; in other words, I will be paying attention to
the blogs and forums which have the most visibility, and are therefore most likely to be
monitored by the government. From here, I will look for a contentious issue which received a lot
of blog attention, which then became a policy issue for the Chinese government. Then, based on
this case study, I will discuss why Chinese leadership needed the modicum of free speech that it
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allows, so that it has a means of controlling its population in the absence of democratic systems
of feedback.
In the US and the EU, I will be focusing on the Stop Online Piracy Act and the AntiCounterfeiting Trade Agreement, respectively, as case studies concerning freedom of speech
where the government controlled discourse. These cases differ from the Chinese case in two
important respects. First, the governments in neither case used overt censorship as a means of
controlling the discourse; to do so would have been patently illegal in both legal systems.
Secondly, the means by which the US and EU control the discourse is in actions taken behind the
scenes; it is in the silence of the discourse, as opposed to the overt statements, that the control of
the discourse comes to the light. In these cases, the governments rely heavily on the
manipulations, propagation, and memes mentioned earlier in the discourse analysis section in
order to control the spoken discourse. Behind the discourse, these governments use tabling of
legislation and private negotiations as methods of moving the government agenda forward,
without having to consult the public directly on how to proceed. In this manner, the governments
have the ability to frame and reframe the discourse until it lands in their favor.
As a minor facet of the methodology, I will also be taking inspiration from Guobin
Yang’s framework for handling web forum observation in order to analyze this data in the most
methodologically sound manner. Guobin Yang uses what he terms the “Multi-interactionism”
method, wherein he focuses on foreground internet activism in interaction with state power,
cultures of contention, the market economy, civil society, and transnationalism. Political scholars
like Guobin Yang and Elizabeth Perry frequently use this approach as a way of discerning
symbols and meaning-making in a culture. By examining historical elements, contextual clues,
and cultural issues, multi-interactionism gains a fuller understanding of the underlying
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implications of discourse across cultures and regimes by using social media as a medium for
research. Thus, I will be implementing the same methodology in analyzing web forums.
CHAPTERS
This thesis will cover these issues in three chapters. In the second chapter, I will focus on
the Wenzhou train crash case study on Chinese free speech and the Internet, examining web
forums and translating commentary, while simultaneously looking at government responses to
these web forums. Chapter 3 will focus on the Stop Online Piracy Act in the United States as a
piece of legislation that provoked a battle over the discourse of freedom of speech between the
US government officials, corporations, and citizens. Chapter 4 will examine the AntiCounterfeiting Trade Agreement in the EU, specifically how the EU is managing to successfully
pursue such an unpopular issue with the public. Chapter 5, the conclusion, will tie together these
case studies to show that, ultimately, freedom of speech is not as simple as a person just speaking
their mind.
More importantly, freedom of speech is less about the rights of an individual, and more
about what rights individuals are permitted to keep by their governments. After all, social
contract theory states that a citizen signs away his rights to a government when he consents to
being a citizen of a nation. Freedom of speech is one of the rights that a citizen may demand in
order to validate his citizenship, but ultimately, the government may choose to revoke this right
if it interferes with the government’s prime directive: governmental stability. In the end, this
thesis seeks to prove that there is more nuance to freedom of speech than the simple presence or
absence of the right. Freedom of speech is a continuum, and freedom of speech is a tool, a tool
used by individual citizens that can be turned against the citizens.
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Chapter 2: China Case Study
Micro-blogging and Other Dangerous High-Speed Projects

Concerning issues of internet governance and freedom of speech, China’s government is
frequently referred to as an example of a government that relies on censorship to govern freedom
of speech. China’s current population, according to the World Bank, is 1.33 billion people,
approximately a sixth of the total world population. According to the Chinese Internet Network
Information Center, as of last year, there were 420 million Chinese “netizens” surfing the web,
plus 277 million mobile phone users with access to the Internet, placing internet penetration at
31.8% of the Chinese population ("中国网民规模达 4.2 亿 手机上网用户 2.77 亿."). With
nearly a third of Chinese citizens using the Internet as a main source of media, it has become a
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tool for change, a fountain of knowledge, and most recently, a forum for social protest. The
government of China, led by the Chinese Communist Party, has noticed this trend, and from the
beginning it has actively shaped how the citizens of China participate in online discourse. By
examining one case in particular, that of the Wenzhou train crash, it becomes clear that the
Chinese government opts to use a panoptic, surveillance model of internet governance in order to
control how citizens use freedom of speech. In turn, this model of governance shows that
China’s government uses freedom of speech as a tool of achieving its own initiatives, and that
allowing some amount of free speech actually helps them convince their citizens better than if
they completely silenced the entire discourse.

The Evolution of the Chinese Internet
According to Professor Guobin Yang of Columbia University, Chinese internet
censorship underwent three phases of government policy evolution. In the first phase, from 1994
to 1999, the government focused on regulating network security, provided a framework for
internet service provisions, and began structuring institutions for regulation. China’s first major
policy framework regarding internet regulation was the “Regulations Concerning the Safety and
Protection of Computer Information Systems,” which outlined principles for government control
of the internet and vested power in the Ministry of Public Security as the governing body of the
Internet (Yang 48). The second major policy document was the “Computer Information
Network and Internet Security, Protection and Management Regulations,” which made China’s
Internet service providers (ISPs) responsible for upholding the regulations set by the government.
This document also detailed the nine types of information that were to be prohibited online,
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including prohibiting the distribution of information which violates laws or the constitution, and
spreading rumors or information which damages the credibility of the state (Yang 49). The
second stage, from 2000 to 2002, expanded and refined Internet control, targeting both Internet
content providers and individual consumers. BBSs (bulletin board services, also known as web
forums) were required to follow a licensing procedure, and BBSs referencing forbidden words
like “Falun Gong” or “June Fourth” were liable to be blocked by the government.
In the third stage, from 2003 to now, there has been, as Yang puts it, “the expansion of
Internet regulation and control from government to governance to governmentality.” The
distinction between these terms is that government comprises the formal institutions, rules, and
practices of the state, while governance comprises both formal and informal actors.
Governmentality denotes “the cultural and social context out of which modes of governance
arise and by which they are sustained” (Yang 48-49). In essence, in the third phase, the Internet
regulations become internalized on a cultural level. Instead of the government needing to
constantly remind every citizen of the censorship rules, citizens began to internalize that certain
topics would always be banned from web forums. For example, Tibet, the Falun Gong, and other
topics are known to be taboo, and people simply won’t discuss them, unless they want to
knowingly aggravate the government.
The Surveillance Model in China
Looking at Foucault’s panopticism as a model for governance, also known as the
surveillance method, it becomes clear that China has reached a panoptic state, in that China uses
the Propaganda Bureau and other surveillance-focused bureaus to allow the Chinese government
to actively observe every Chinese citizen on the internet without the citizen knowing when they
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are being watched. Foucault, who first established the framework of the panoptic state, asserts
the basic premise that knowledge is power, and that the government derives all power over its
citizens by controlling information and narratives of knowledge. From this basic premise,
Foucault notes that a panoptic state has two goals: first, isolate those who are “the deviant, the
diseased, or the dissenters” (Gandy 10) and second, to normalize the rest of the society by
establishing solid “norms” of thought which the people must follow (Gandy 11). In a perfectly
functioning surveillance model state, the government will first censor materials as a way of
marking those who are deviants, those who are not to be emulated, and to remove ideas that are
considered undesirable from the government. Second, the people, seeking to avoid punishment,
will internalize notions of what can and cannot be said. In other words, people began to exhibit
self-censoring behavior as a result of internalizing the government’s narrative of knowledge.
China displays many of the classic elements of a panoptic state as understood in
Foucauldian terms. As Yang demonstrates, the final stage of freedom of speech control in China
is that the government has managed to make the people internalize this control mechanism,
creating a society of citizens that engage in self-censoring, which is then reinforced by active
government censorship that leaves only the opinions of which the government approves. The
Chinese authorities allows a temporary window in time for freedom for citizens to speak on the
internet, so that the government can determine which opinions and narratives it wishes to
endorse as “normal”. Before censoring begins, the government watches what comments are
posted. In this case study, we will see that the government did not start censoring content until
well after they knew about the train crash controversy. Then, the government develops their
response and begins censoring all opinions deemed dangerous to this new central narrative. The
surveillance method is characterized by a situation where the government can see everything that
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is posted, and has the ability to control all that is posted. As a result, the government can safely
allow some level of “freedom of speech” for a time, in order to see what people believe. Then,
the government can respond to these points of view, or remove them from the public sphere, with
little worry that the speech will create instability in the society that could uproot the government.
In short, the surveillance model is “a flexible engine. It can be used to decide what sorts
of facts constitute information, to determine what sorts of information ought to be privileged and
which do not matter, to gather that information, to empower people or entities to gather
information, to act on the information gathered” (Backer 4). The Chinese government is in the
privileged position to use this model; to decide what is factual and what is fictitious, to rewrite
narratives, to stop others from speaking or allow others to speak when they see fit.
The Chinese government has various tools available to it in order to maintain its control
over Internet discourse. Three of its main tools are the blocking of posting specific words on
blogs, denial of service for specific websites, and the Fifty Cent Party. The first tool allows the
Chinese government to silence specific issues before anything can even be posted. The
government’s special project, “The Golden Shield,” the government Internet policing force,
issues lists of censored terms to web service providers and specific websites, like blogging
platforms (Liang and Lu 106). These platforms and ISPs are forced to comply or the government
will shut the website down for defying a government order. The second tool, DNS, denial of
service, stops citizens from even accessing certain pages by cutting off the computer’s ability to
connect with the webpage. This tool is how the Chinese government prevents Facebook, Twitter,
and several other Western sites from being accessed within China’s borders (Fallows). The final
tool is one of idea generation. The Fifty Cent Party is not actually a party in any real sense; it is
not a wing of the government, nor is it part of the party machinery in any formalized fashion.
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The term describes the hordes of workers the government employs to isolate blog posts for
censorship. The corps members of this group are supposed to be reimbursed 50 mao for their
work, hence the name Fifty Cent Party. In addition, these censors will also post positive
messages about the government as a way of counteracting negative postings online. Through
these three tools, the government has excellent abilities to both monitor and censor Internet
speech activity. By examining one case study, that of the Wenzhou train crash on July 23rd, 2011,
it becomes clear that China is opting to use this type of governance. Indeed, the Wenzhou train
crash becomes a chance to investigate the Chinese government’s management of media reports
and their response to the train crash as a case study to elucidate China’s surveillance model of
free speech.
The Wenzhou Train Crash
On July 23rd, 2011, it is commonly accepted throughout the world that a 16-car working
train D3115 was hit from the rear by Beijing – Fuzhou train D301, a high-speed railway train, on
a viaduct platform in Wenzhou, Zhejiang Province, China ("First Fatal Crash on Chinese High
Speed Line”). This crash resulted in a significant number of injuries and deaths; the exact
number of those dead varies based on different government and media accounts. It is also widely
known that the Chinese government has placed great import in recent years on the growth of
China’s high-speed railways. The Chinese government has decided to spend 113 billion dollars a
year “on railway infrastructure and rolling stock in the next four years, all funded under an
ambitious build-out initiated by the 2004-2020 mid and long-term railway development plan by
China's Ministry of Railways” (Fischer). This is part of a larger, 293 billion dollar plan to lay
down 16,000 kilometers of “dedicated high-speed rail lines connecting all of China's major cities
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by 2020”, which would create a total of 120,000 kilometers of rail in China, making it the largest
rail expansion in the history of the world (Fischer).
Due to the money involved in this project, and the avid desire for the government to
expand the railway system, the Wenzhou train crash was immediately a crisis for the Chinese
government. This crash has the potential to call into question the safety of the Chinese railway
development project, and has broader implications for China’s rapid modernization. These future
development projects are foundational to the CCP’s claim to legitimate governance, which is
partially based on its ability to deliver strong economic results.
The government took an active role in how this event was portrayed in the media because
this crash had the potential to affect the Chinese people’s perception of the government’s
legitimacy. As a result, the facts surrounding this case have been written and rewritten,
constructed and reconstructed, countless times, through the censorship of the Chinese
government. By examining what the Chinese government chose to censor, this case study will
show that the Chinese Communist Party follows a panoptic model of governance. First, the
government allowed commentary to continue on the issue only if it followed the party’s desired
timeline of the truth, thus granting “freedom of speech” in a highly limited sense. Second, and
more importantly, it is significant that the government did not shut down Sina Weibo or any
microblogging sites over this issue. It allowed for dissenting comments to be published, even
though it could put in a BBS direct censoring of the words “Wenzhou train crash,” and all
commentary would be silenced. Instead, the government has allowed for comments to be posted
for a time before taking them down. For example, in Figure 4, the comment, “Taking a fast train
is meant to be safe and fast; who would have thought that now it is only fast?” would normally
be seen as a direct criticism of the government; however, it was allowed to pass through the
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censors. By allowing the government to read these opinions, it can prepare the proper response to
this crash which will appease the Chinese people.
In order to best construct the discourse surrounding the Wenzhou train crash, I have
reconstructed four timelines. In each timeline, elements of the discourse reveal how the
government frames the discourse to control the portrayal of the train crash. In each timeline,
there are also elements of bias, based on the institutions and the actors, as was referenced in the
methodology section of Chapter 1. The first, the international media timeline of the events, is an
account of what the world at large thinks is the most accurate series of the events that occurred.
The international media here is separate from the Chinese media, in that writers from the New
York Times and the BBC News are not held accountable for their articles by the Chinese
government or even their own governments for that matter; writers for Xinhua do have to heed
the government’s warnings, or they could potentially lose their jobs or be imprisoned. Thus, the
international media timeline is more thorough by virtue of being less pliant to a specific
government’s motives. The strength of this timeline is that it has the most cohesive factual
structuring of events, free of censorship, so that a full delineation of the events can be described.
There is a slight bit of bias in the international media, as the international media takes a negative
stance on what it perceives to be Chinese government censorship, thereby skewing public
opinion on the government’s actions.
The second narrative is that of the Chinese government, following its responses and
public statements. It is necessary to see how the Chinese government frames the crash through its
statements to the media, as well as its own publications. The bias here is something this case
study seeks to understand: what is the government’s position, and how is it based in the
surveillance model. Clearly, the government wants the national, China-based media portraying
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the events in a manner that is positive towards the government, but there are more nuances here
that will be unpacked later.
The third narrative examined is that of the Chinese media, which has been picked apart
by Chinese government censors; however, the Chinese media does have its own voice separate
from the government. The benefit of examining this timeline is that the missing data speaks
volumes. The Chinese-language publications have either been redacted from the original
versions, or report the “cut and dry” government-issued statements. The bare-bones writing of
the remaining articles on the crash from the Chinese press displays for the Chinese public how
the Chinese government wants the people to discuss this issue. The timeline here seeks to capture
what can be found of the original content, combined with the governmentally influenced
reporting and the redacted versions. The bias here is that the Chinese news media reporting is
heavily limited on what it can say by the Chinese government, so the Chinese news media story
is not as fully fleshed out as its international media counterpart.
Finally, the fourth timeline focuses on the Chinese Twitter-esque microblogging site,
Sina Weibo (新浪微波). It was on this very website that details concerning the crash first leaked
onto the internet. Subsequent censoring by the government has removed a number of tweets on
the crash; however, the international media has preserved some of the original content, and some
less controversial tweets remain on the site today. The strength of this content is that it allows for
insight into the minds of the Chinese people, who are allowed to speak their mind on the issue, at
least until the censors intervene. In this way, it allows for us to see what the government is
responding to. The bias here is that the people, by the nature of being merely observers of the
events, cannot be credentialed or considered experts in the field of high-speed railway crashes,
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nor are they privy to all the details of this case. Instead, what they give us is the public mindset
which the Chinese government is trying to mold.
Comparing Timelines
(See Figures 1-4 for reconstructed timelines)
In every version of this timeline, the events unfold in this pattern: on July 23, 2011, at
approximately 8:23pm, the trains collided. Immediately after the accident, the Chinese
government issued a report that the first train was stalled due to a lightning strike and that the
second train collided with the first one due to a malfunction. Starting on July 26th, international
news agencies start to question the validity of the government’s story. Experts start testifying
that if a lightning strike has indeed stopped the train, that the other train on the track would not
have been able to move either. On July 28th, the government acknowledges that there was a flaw
in the train design, although the intricacies of what precisely failed are not revealed to the public.
To this day, the exact failure remains unknown across all four timelines. In response, the
government suspends the production of new high-speed rails, and the State Council issues a
mandate that all safety systems of high-speed rails must be examined. In all four timelines, the
issue of accountability becomes tantamount, and the government has not overlooked this issue.
Between the events, the China’s government framed the discourse through information
gathered from citizens posting on Sina Weibo, a microblog, using the surveillance model.
Looking for details about the Wenzhou train crash from the Chinese government’s websites
currently is like trying to find the needle in the haystack. For example, China’s Ministry of
Railways website (http://www.china-mor.gov.cn/) has absolutely no news reports about the
Wenzhou train crash, despite being the ministry directly responsible for the railway oversight
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and upkeep in China. If anyone is to be blamed for the train crash, it is this ministry, and yet
there are no reports developed on the cause of the crash to be found on the Ministry’s page. All
that is present is a report issued on October 14, 2011, announcing that the Zhengzhou Railway
Bureau is drawing up plans to improve their “opening and operation of high-speed rail
equipment quality inspection and supervision and management measures" (“郑州局出台高铁开
通前设备检查管理办法”). The government reports that the international and Chinese news
agencies cite were only oral statements or brief written ones. The world is still waiting for the
formalized reports to be issued by the government. As the Sina Weibo bloggers complain, the
government has been promising that they would deliver this report, and yet, over four months
after the crash, nothing was published (See Figure 4). However, just because nothing has been
published formally does not mean the government has been inactive in this case. On the contrary,
by allowing the microbloggers to continue blogging, the Chinese government has given
themselves a window into the minds of the populace, allowing them to find the most contentious
issues amongst the people, allowing for a future report to address these key issues. The
government utilized social media sites like Sina Weibo to extricate this information from the
public.
First, the government made use of the Sina Weibo outbursts to see how to respond to and
manage the crisis. Early microbloggers posted complaints about the need for the government to
“take responsibility,” the dangers of high speed travel, and worries about the reliability of these
new high-speed lines. Thus, the concepts of safety and accountability were memes invoked by
the people as a response to this crisis, and these memes, or commonly held values in a society or
group of people, carried the discourse. These blog posts were quickly deleted, and now only exist
in English translated forms on international news reports (See Figure 4). Afterward, the
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government began issuing demands for better safety protocols, firing government workers, and
Wen Jiabao began commenting on how the government will improve safety (See Figures 1, 2, 3,
and 4). Thus, these memes were the focus of the government reaction. However, there is a reason
the government didn’t stop all blogging about the Wenzhou crash. If the government wanted, it
could have issued an order to all BBSs and micro-blogging platforms to not allow any postings
containing the terms “Wenzhou crash.” They did not do so. I suggest that a very likely reason is
so that the government could directly observe the concerns posted by its citizens. After finding
these core issues, they then had the ability to go back and delete all evidence that the postings
ever occurred.
Indeed, looking at the complaints of the micro-bloggers and the subsequent government
response to the crash, it is clear that the CCP was directly tailoring the content of the reports and
their actions to confront issues the bloggers raised. The government immediately fired three
officials, so as to show that the government was taking responsibility for its actions. Then, in
response to claims about the dangers of the trains, the government mandated that all the rail line
safety systems be re-evaluated. Even after the government fired these government officials, the
micro-bloggers continued to protest, but the issues were now focused on reporting what exactly
happened during the crash, and the attention turned away more from the government holding its
workers accountable. In addition, as previously mentioned, the government then suspended the
addition of new train lines (See Figure 3). The ongoing investigation, which will produced the
much-anticipated report as to what exactly failed on July 23rd, is another means for the
government to show the people that they can take responsibility for their actions, that they are
deeply vested in the safety and reliability of these lines, and that they are taking steps to make
sure that this incident is never repeated. It is telling that the very posts that were deleted by
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censors (See Figure 4) contained the very accusations against the government that the CCP then
chose to respond to directly (See Figure 3).
This sort of behavior, the observing of the people, responding, and then removing the
argument from the internet, is precisely the sort of behavior that describes surveillance
governance. The discourse was altered by addressing concerns related to the memes of safety
and accountability. The focus on these particular issues show the government was implementing
the surveillance method and also allowed the government to regain control of the discourse from
the people. Initially, the government had no control over how the information was leaked.
However, instead of immediately issuing orders to restrict bloggers, the government waited for a
day or two to see what the main concerns were. Then, after taking note of the aired grievances,
the government promptly began censoring micro-blogs and news reports that were considered
controversial. Concomitant with the beginning of the micro-blog censorship, the government
also issued the directive to the media, restricting what it could publish; here, the discourse is
taken into the “never-seen” realm, where the government has greater power to silence versions of
the discourse of events. The orders were as follows: “1. Release death toll only according to
figures from authorities. 2. Do not report on a frequent basis. 3. More touching stories are to be
reported instead, i.e. blood donation, free taxi services, etc. 4. Do not investigate the causes of
the accident; use information released from authorities as standard. 5. Do not reflect or
comment” (See Figure 2). The international media heavily critiqued China for issuing this sort of
gag order on the media. However, this sort of directive is very common for the Chinese
government and the Chinese media, as was observed by China Digital Times (See Figure 2).
Now, it is highly relevant that the government chose to restrict the general print and TV
media immediately, but not micro-bloggers. Micro-bloggers, representing the netizens of China,
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present the primary audience of the discourse that the Chinese government must frame, and they
are the ones who must be manipulated successfully by the discourse. The Chinese media, on the
other hand, has two roles: it is either means for the government to give its narrative, its side of
the story, its version of the discourse, or, the media has an independent voice, and independent
frame on the discourse. In either case, the media isn’t the central issue; the micro-bloggers and
netizens are. In terms of propagation power, the media has a louder voice than a single,
anonymous blogger; thus, in terms of discourse analysis, the media has more power to alter the
discourse on the Wenzhou train crash in ways the government would dislike. In short, the
government can use a micro-blogger’s opinion, take note of its message, and delete it, and in all
likelihood, its absence from the internet will go unmarked. Thousands of tweets about the crash
were censored, and the international media only preserved a scant few, hence there are only four
examples in Figure 4. The Chinese news media, on the other hand, is disseminated, cited by
other news sources, and leaves an impression on the discourse that is much harder to erase.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the CCP ultimately controls CCTV, Xinhua, and most
major news media sources. Typically, when the government needs to speak, it can count on these
media sources to say what the government wants, how it wants it to be stated. For this reason, the
Chinese government immediately cracked down on the national media agencies, shaping its
dialogue. The news media later began to pull away from the strictures of the government
directives, but still, the news reports from the Chinese media shy away from the aggressive
language of the international news media. The Western media is not afraid of directly
confronting the Chinese government for failure. Indeed it took the Chinese media until August
4th to even publish that there had been flaws in the train design (the international news media
starting making claims to such flaws starting as early as July 26th).
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The surveillance model is also echoed in two elements of the Chinese government’s
reaction: the separation of dissenting opinions through censorship and declaration of words to be
left unspoken, and the turning of the memes in the government’s favor, which the civilians then
assimilate into their discourse. In this example, the Chinese government has succeeded in both
areas. First, the government watched to see what the main complaints were. They then responded
to those complaints concerning accountability. Second, dissenters, or those whose discussions on
microblogs questioned the Chinese railway projects or Chinese modernity, had their comments
removed, as reflected in the data charts. Other microbloggers, aware that these blog posts were
being removed (See Figure 4), know that if they comment in ways that the government finds
offensive that they too will be censored, or perhaps even punished directly by the Chinese
government. As such, people follow only the narratives that the government has established as
“safe”. These discourses focus on how the government still hasn’t published the reports they
promised about what went wrong on the railways on July 23rd. When the government does
publish a report, which will likely address blogger concerns, this report will then go on to shape
the future discourse. In this way, the government has a high amount of the control of the
discussion, from here on out. Thus, in three steps, the government first watched, then separated
dissenting opinions, and then created the norm for the netizens to use for their self-regulating,
normalizing behavior.
Overall, the Wenzhou train crash reveals that the Chinese government actively allowed
people to speak about the Wenzhou train crash, despite how badly it reflects on the Chinese
government, because their voices are useful to feed China’s surveillance model of Internet
governance. This crash is still reverberating throughout Internet forums in China. In a country
where most citizens use high-speed rail as a means of transit, the safety of this means of
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transportation is paramount. Yet, people still continue to use the railways, and no one has moved
to unseat the government for not providing sufficiently safe public transit. In other words, the
Chinese government has preserved its mandate to rule, has created the image that it is still
upholding its social contract. Thus, not only is China using the surveillance model, it is using it
and will continue to use it effectively as a means of framing public discourse and shaping
historical and political narratives. More broadly, this study shows how an authoritarian regime,
instead of simply silencing dissent, appropriated the discourse of citizens to further its personal
agenda and reinforce regime stability, instead of allowing the speech to confound government
goals as dissenters had intended.

Chapter 3: US Case Study
How the Internet Stopped the Stop Online Piracy Act: US Case Study
At the heart of regime stability is economic progress. The Wenzhou train crash proved
that economic progress is a central narrative, a meme, upon which much of government
discourse is built. It is clear why this meme is common between governments; from a thriving
economy comes jobs, and from jobs come the basic necessities for survival. On first blush, when
looking at the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA), introduced to the US Congress by Representative
Lamar Smith of Texas on October 26, 2011, and the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
(ACTA) in the United States and the European Union, it would seem that these legislations and
agreements merely concern copyright abuse. However, at the heart of these conflicts are losses of
jobs due to pirating information, on the one hand, and freedom of speech, on the other. Both
sides of the SOPA and ACTA debates are concerned with issues at the heart of regime stability,
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specifically economic progress and the rule of law, and the EU and US must control the
discourse surrounding copyright infringement through manipulation, propagation, and memes, as
defined by discourse theory, in order to achieve their long-term goals of intellectual property
protection. These cases are both examples of how these two regime types, a democratic republic
and a supranational authority, utilize citizens’ freedom of speech to forward government
initiatives, instead of just responding to citizen demands. These cases illustrate that freedom of
speech does not always empower the citizen over the government, but that sometimes the reverse
effect occurs.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE INTERNET IN THE WEST
When considering the role of the United States government in the Internet, it is critical to
remember that without the US government, the Internet would not exist in its current form.
Tracing the Internet back to its origins, the Internet began humbly, with academics publishing
papers in the early 1960s on “Information Flow in Large Communication Nets" (Kleinrock) and
slowly developing the network components necessary for the leap to Internet technology. While
the components for creating the Internet slowly came into academia, the pressures of the Cold
War on the United States created a necessity for a system of communication that could withstand
nuclear holocaust. The newly-created Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA),
developed in 1958 by the US government in response to Russia’s Sputnik launch and display of
superior technological advancement (Kleinrock), was determined to create such a network.
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In pursuit of this goal, US government contacted engineers and scientists working on data
network theory such as Paul Baran, researcher at the RAND Corporation, and Leonard Kleinrock,
professor at UCLA, to design this new system. ARPA then provided funding for these
researchers to develop the ARPANET, “a government-supported data network” (Kleinrock). In
1969, ARPANET was first put to the test, with the first node of ARPANET installed at UCLA
and the seventh node at the RAND Institute in Santa Monica (Kleinrock). In 1983, ARPANET
divided into MILNET, the military component of the network, and the second version of
ARPANET, which consisted of non-military-related data networks. In 1989, the ARPANET title
was updated to more accurately reflect this versatile new network. The moniker given was "the
Internet," and the name stuck.
Currently, the Internet has become an immensely influential force in American society
and indeed the world. According to Pew Research, “fully 95% of all teens ages 12-17 are now
online and 80% of those online teens are users of social media sites.” Essentially, nearly every
teenager in America is being raised with the Internet as a primary media source (Lenhart). The
rich also have increasing access to the Internet; “95% of those in households earning over
$75,000 use the internet and cell phones” (Jansen). Of the overall American population, as of
2008, Nielsen reports that “Overall, 80.6% of homes in Nielsen’s National People Meter panel
have a computer (either desktop or laptop) in their homes as of mid-November, 2008.” Of those
with personal computers, 91.6% have “some sort of internet connection” ("An Overview of
Home Internet Access in the U.S."). This data suggests that the Internet has become a very
important medium of receiving and exchanging information in American households. Especially
among the American youth, the Internet is becoming a predominant means of communication,
information dissemination and collection.
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Americans using the internet are not passively receiving information; the Internet is
becoming the community of the 21st century. According to Nielsen, “today nearly 4 in 5 active
Internet users visit social networks and blogs,” and “Americans spend more time on Facebook
than they do on any other U.S. website” ("State of the Media: Social Media Report"). Social
networking sites are designed for sharing personal information, beliefs, and social commentary
with others in the network. As Nielsen affirms, of these adults using social networking sites, they
are “26% more likely to give their opinion on politics and current events” compared to their
peers who did not use social networking sites. In other words, social networking in the Internet
age is correlated with increasing awareness and promotion of political discourses.
The EU and the US must grapple with dissent in public discourse in this new medium,
just as the Chinese government must. While the Chinese government chooses particular modes
of censorship, the US and the EU implement different methods of social and political coercion to
achieve their ends. In this chapter, the focus will be on the US’s method of controlling freedom
of speech through managing the discourse on the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) with
manipulations, and on the US’s government’s ability to manufacture consent through drafting
and redrafting of legislation.
In the United States, out of many possible cases, this thesis writer chose to study SOPA
because it shows how citizens and US corporations galvanized around the issue of online piracy,
creating a cohesive alternative narrative to the US government’s discourse. Citizens in the 21st
century have become used to a high degree of freedom in the Internet sphere. As technology has
developed further and more content becomes available online, finding illegally uploaded movies
and music online is just a click or two away. Used to this ease of access, citizens fought back
when the government prioritized changing this unsustainable content-stealing culture that has
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developed, a culture that deprives movie production studios of profit and threatens the strength
of the movie industry. US law dictates that this infringement is illegal, and while citizens have
become adjusted to illegal online downloads, the government is now seeking to change that
culture. However, SOPA became much more than a simple debate on online piracy; the
discourse became intertwined with the future of US governance of freedom of speech on the
internet, and on the basis of fearing censorship, the US citizens convinced the US House of
Representatives to remove the act from debate. The puzzle is that the act is in the process of
being redrafted. This case examines how and why the government decided to ignore citizen
complaints and continued to pursue its agenda through discourse manipulation.
First, it is important to understand the governments’ representatives’ motives behind the
SOPA project. The government representatives made SOPA a priority because of the growing
pressure from private corporations to strengthen US copyright protections online. In the Internet
age, upholding this system is an entirely different process than before the digital era. In the era of
newsprint and vinyl, trying to copy books and music or other forms of creative content under
copyright protect was an involved process; one had to duplicate thousands of hard copies,
requiring a major time investment and money expenditure. With computers and digital files, the
same process of copying information occurs in seconds, with a simple click of a mouse. With the
advent of the Internet came this ability to share information and content that is under copyright,
and suddenly those copyrights became harder to protect and enforce. The Stop Online Piracy Act
was as an attempt to maintain control over infringement of intellectual property (IP) rights.
The SOPA case allows for a deeper exploration of how the US government and its
representatives manage discourse on the Internet. Twitter became a fighting ground for winning
public opinion on SOPA, and as such, Congressmen and Congresswomen in the US House of
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Representatives took to Twitter to voice their opinions on the bill. Twitter allowed the
government to see exactly what aspects of SOPA concerned citizens, and many representatives
attempted to address these concerns. Ultimately, the representatives in favor of SOPA lost
support for the bill, both in the House and in the public eye.
The key question is why did SOPA fail to pass in the House? There have been multiple
reasons given, in the media and over Twitter, for why SOPA failed. One reason commonly cited
is that SOPA itself was not a well-worded piece of legislation. The bill was intentionally unclear
in certain areas, including Section 103, which called for any websites “enabling or facilitating”
copyright infringement to be shut down. Taken to the extreme, this section could be interpreted
to mean that even if only one person on Facebook, for example, posts a link to a site with
copyright-infringed content, all of Facebook would be liable to be shut down. The ambiguity in
the text led to loss of support from most Internet-based companies, especially those functioning
in the realm of social media, as their Internet sites were left vulnerable and the companies feared
profit losses if the law passed. There is a solid case to be made that the bill was simply poorly
worded.
However, on a more theoretical level, this case study shows through discourse analysis
that the reason the act failed was because Internet companies had the upper hand on propagation.
Propagation, the ability to spread a discourse to the maximum amount of people quickly, was the
key element of discourse in the case of SOPA. The companies and representatives in favor of
SOPA had excellent tools of manipulation and meme implementation; however, the Internetbased firms had a wider audience, one they called upon to stop SOPA through manipulation and
memes of their own. The distinguishing factor was that the Internet sites’ manipulations and
memes in the discourse were heard by more people.
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This case study will focus on four discourses in the SOPA debate, those of the US
government representatives for and against SOPA, media corporations with vested interests in
seeing SOPA come to fruition, internet corporations with vested interests opposing SOPA, and
the voice of the American public on the Internet as seen through web comments on Twitter, and
online newspapers publishing articles on SOPA. In order to reconstruct the discourse, this case
will first review the text of SOPA as it was proposed. Second, the Internet and old media
companies’ response to SOPA will show how the corporate world reframed the discourse,
examining the visual rhetoric from both sides the day before SOPA was debated in the House of
Representatives. Third, the citizen responses from Twitter show how the American public
engaged with the discourse, primarily perpetuating the manipulations and memes of either side
of the discourse. Finally, the US public officials’ Twitter posts show how the government
watched the public reaction to SOPA and then decided to withdraw their support for the bill as
protests continued.
THE TEXT OF THE STOP ONLINE PIRACY ACT
The text of the Stop Online Piracy Act clearly delineates the desire for Congress to
actively intervene in stopping online piracy, and is not inherently designed to hinder freedom of
speech. The second section of the bill actually explicitly states this principle: “Nothing in this
Act shall be construed to impose a prior restraint on free speech or the press protected under the
1st amendment to the Constitution” (“Stop Online Piracy Act” 2). Prior restraint is a legal term,
and prior restraint is illegal in the United States and under English Common Law. In essence,
outlawing prior restraint prohibits governments from banning expression of ideas prior to their
publication ("Prior Restraint"). The Chinese government’s censorship lists are examples of prior
restraint. Clearly, the US government did not employ rhetoric supporting infringement on
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freedom of speech in SOPA, because it would be illegal. Thus, most of the later allegations on
the act’s “intentions” to destroy freedom of speech are not founded in any part of the actual act.
However, there are sections of the act that have fueled the SOPA controversy,
particularly Section 103. This section defines those who have infringed upon copyrights. The
wording leaves some ambiguity.
(1) DEDICATED TO THEFT OF U.S. PROPERTY.—An ‘‘Internet site is
dedicated to theft of U.S. property’’ if— (A) it is an Internet site, or a portion
thereof, that is a U.S.-directed site and is used by users within the United
States; and (B) either— (i) the U.S.-directed site is primarily designed or
operated for the purpose of, has only limited purpose or use other than, or is
marketed by its operator or another acting in concert with that operator for use
in, offering goods or services in a manner that engages in, enables, or
facilitates… (“Stop Online Piracy Act 25)
The section goes on to describe, essentially, foreign sites that steal copyrighted
information. The key part of the definition that has Internet companies panicking is “facilitates.”
This definition is very loose, allowing for courts to accuse a wide array of Internet sites of
copyright infringement. The government’s rhetoric started the discourse, setting the tone of
foreign sites versus US enterprises, in an act that seeks to protect copyrights while upholding free
speech.
THE CORPORATE PERSPECTIVE ON SOPA
First came the government’s initial manipulation of the discourse through drafting SOPA;
then the discourse underwent manipulations from the arguments between old and new media. To
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exemplify this debate, the PBS NewsHour of Jan. 17, 2012, brought in corporate representations
of both Internet and old media corporations. On the Internet side of the debate, there was Ben
Huh, CEO of Cheezburger, a very popular website that displays comedic content of funny cats,
videos of people making mistakes, the sort of site that benefits from visitors procrastinating on
more important tasks. On the old media corporation side was Rick Cotton of NBCUniversal,
executive vice president and general counsel. As the NBCUniversal corporate page helpfully
notes, he “supervises the NBCUniversal Law Department, which provides legal advice to all
NBCUniversal business units for their ongoing operations and for new strategic plans and
acquisitions” ("NBCUniversal-Rick Cotton"). These two corporate chiefs represent the Internet
and “old media” sides of the SOPA debate, respectively, and their responses to each other follow
old and new media’s respective discourses on SOPA very closely.
Ben Huh’s responses followed the pre-scripted discourse of the Internet corporations
perfectly. He told PBS that he is opposed to SOPA because the legislation will “curb first
amendment rights on the internet and prohibit growth of American jobs in the US sector” (“A
World Without Wikipedia”). These are the two major areas of manipulation that the Internet

corporations employed in the SOPA debate: free speech and jobs. On the free speech point, Huh
duly observes that there is a Fair Use clause involved in the law surrounding copyrighted
material. According to Cornell University’s Legal Information Institute the Fair Use limitation
on copyright protections reads as follows: “the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such
use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section,
for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for
classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright” (17 USC. Sec. 107).
Mr. Huh feels that SOPA violates the Fair Use clause, as websites who mock copyrighted
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material (his site is an example of such websites) could be unfairly persecuted for violating
copyrighted material. Moreover, he feels the lobbyists Motion Picture Association of America
(MPAA) and Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) are specifically abusing the
fair use of copyrighted material, as they are well known proponents of the legislation. Ben Huh
summarizes the Internet company perspective as follows: “We are in support of bills that curb
piracy and counterfeiting if it does not infringe on our first amendment rights, does not lower our
standing in the international community by preventing people from using censorship tools, as
well as protecting American jobs” (“A World Without Wikipedia”). The irony here, of course, is
that his statement aligns directly with what SOPA wants to achieve, according to the act itself.
On the other side of the debate stands Rick Cotton. NBCUniversal supports SOPA
because “what is at stake are the jobs of millions of Americans.” His claims are that the
entertainment industry is “under assault,” that these foreign sites are “trafficking in stolen
content,” and that the bill is about foreign websites, not about fair use. He notes that only court
orders with “full due process” will allow sites to be shut down, and that there is “no lack of
clarity” in how bill is written. Overall, Cotton’s main theme is that “protecting the internet
requires that it be under the rule of law” (“A World Without Wikipedia”).
Here, the memes and manipulations of both sides of the corporate argumentation become
clear. On the anti-SOPA side, Internet corporations use underlying concerns about censorship
and loss of freedom of speech as an important meme, using rhetoric than manipulates the listener
into fearing these subconscious issues. On the pro-SOPA side, old media is focusing on memes
like “job loss” and “foreign invasion by international illegal content sharers” and “competition”.
On the anti-SOPA side, words like “infringe,” “censorship,” and invoking “first amendment
rights” evoke the desired memes, whereas the pro-SOPA side employs language like
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“trafficking,” “rule of law,” and “under assault” to manipulate the listener into remembering
memes like nationalism and government control.
From this rhetorical basis comes the majority of the discourse surrounding SOPA on the
public opinion level. As Khan Academy, a website that offers free academic tutorials, explained
it in a Youtube video for the public, they also largely object to Section 103 of SOPA, specifically
the “enables or facilitates” portion. They note that user boards create issues for Facebook,
Youtube, CNN.com, anyone with a message board that could link to illegal sites outside the US.
Moreover, this section makes any action to “avoid confirming” piracy illegal, thus making any
obfuscation of company actions illegal; in other words, this section would remove all privacy of
company actions on the internet (“SOPA and PIPA”). Khan Academy is a non-profit, and while it
does have stakes in the Internet corporation side of the issue, it is also generally non-partisan on
these types of issues.
Both liberals and conservatives began to have misgivings about SOPA. The National Review
writer Nathaniel Botwinick, known for his conservative bent, agreed with the Khan Academy in
his November 30, 2011 article. He observes that “’facilitation’” is the dangerous word in the
targeting criteria. Facebook, Tumblr, and dozens of other popular websites could be accused of
‘facilitating’ the spread of pirated material if one of their members happens to post a copyrighted
movie or song” (Botwinick). He also notes that the repercussions on the Internet companies
would be severe: “Under SOPA, Internet service providers would be required to block access to
websites the DOJ deems guilty of such activity.” Botwinick also notes that “the driving industry
behind SOPA is the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA).” The MPAA, being one of
the behemoths of old media, obviously has stakes against copyright infringement. Michael
O’Leary, vice president of the MPAA, has been quoted by Botwinick as saying that “millions of
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Americans associated with the production of movies in America would lose their jobs” if current
copyright infringement issues continue. Overall, Botwinick concludes that the MPAA has
created impetus behind a flawed bill that should not pass.
These actors created the verbal discourse surrounding SOPA in the months preceding the US
House of Representatives’ debate on the act. In the rhetorical battle for discourse control, there
was not necessarily a clear winner. It was in the battle for visual rhetoric and in protest that the
Internet corporations gained an upper hand. The day before the House debates, Internet
corporations staged a united “black-out protest” of their websites, meaning that users could not
access some content on the webpages of participating companies, or that the websites posted
anti-SOPA messages for the entire day before the debates began. It was this protest, performed
using visual and verbal rhetoric, which swayed the discourse against SOPA.
THE SOPA BLACKOUT: CORPORATIONS’ VISUAL RHETORIC IN THE SOPA
DISCOURSE
One way in which the corporations against SOPA dominated the discourse debate
successfully was through superior visual rhetoric. On January 18, 2012, the day that SOPA was
to be debated in the House of Representatives, some of the largest and most successful Internet
firms performed a “blackout” of their content. Some websites, like Wikipedia, blocked their
content such that users could not access any parts of the site. Others, like Google, implemented a
splash page that forced users, before accessing the website’s contents, to see a “Stop
SOPA/PIPA” message, encouraging the user to speak out against the legislation.
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Figure 1: Wired SOPA Blackout Page

Figure 3: BoingBoing.com SOPA Blackout

Screenshot

Page Screenshot (Scalera)

(Scalera)

Figure 2: CraigsList SOPA Blackout Page

Figure 4: WordPress SOPA Blackout Page

Screenshot (Scalera)

Screenshot (Scalera)
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Figure 5: OReilly Media SOPA Blackout

Figure 7: Mozilla Firefox SOPA Blackout

Page Screenshot (Scalera)

Page Screenshot (Scalera)

Figure 8: Google Search Page & Logo
Figure 6: Wikipedia SOPA Blackout Page
SOPA Blackout Page Screenshot (Scalera)
Screenshot
(Scalera)
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Figure 9: Reddit SOPA Blackout Page
Screenshot (Scalera)

61

The above images represent a selection of nine of the blackout page visuals from nine of
the Internet’s highest volume sites.

The visual rhetoric is clearly designed to be similar. Every

single one uses a black and white color scheme, designed to represent the “blackout,” while also
setting the serious tone necessary to impress the severity of the situation on the audience. Seven
of the nine use all-black pages to completely block all visual access to content and use white text
describing next actions for users. The other two black out sentences (See Figure 1) or the website
title (See Figure 8). Two of the nine offer links to clips that are anti-SOPA/PIPA, and every
single one offers to help the user contact a government representative. The Google blackout site
is the least specific about further steps for the user; however, by simply clicking on the blacked
out Google logo, the user was brought to a search results page containing search results for antiSOPA/PIPA sites. From the visual rhetoric present, it is apparent that the Internet companies’
manipulation had three intended effects: to remove content for a day, to show the user what “a
world under SOPA” would look like both visually and through the absence of content, all to
create the desire to oppose SOPA. All of this is from the visuals.
Of course, the corporations in favor of SOPA also implemented visual rhetoric to
convince the American public to support SOPA and to counteract the Internet company
blackouts. MSNBC aired a pro-SOPA commercial during the Chris Matthews show on January
18, 2012, the same day Congress started debating SOPA, and the same day as the Internet
blackouts. This thirty second commercial had the following transcript:

American ideas, they shine through a thousand new products, software, and
movies, creating millions of new jobs. But now American creativity and
innovation are under attack. Everyday foreign criminals use illegal websites to
steal American products, steal our ideas, and put Americans out of work. It’s time
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for

a

new

idea.

Tell

Congress

to

Stop

Online

Piracy.

(“MSNBC

CreativeAmerica.org SOPA Ad Original.”)

This commercial visually presented a light bulb against a black background, which when
lit, glowed with the American flag. As the discussion of foreign criminals began, the lightbulb
exploded, and the flag vanished, to signify the death of American ideas and jobs. The visual
rhetoric here is not unlike those of the blackout pages; the color scheme is dark, and the wording
is designed to mirror the loss of the lightbulb, a meme of knowledge and ideas, and the American
flag, a meme for nationalism. This ad is meant to stimulate feelings of nationalism and play upon
fears of unemployment in a difficult economic climate.
THE CITIZEN RESPONSE TO SOPA
The American citizen is not a passive recipient of discourse. Recall Foucault’s statement
in History of Sexuality, Vol. 1, that “discourses are not once and for all subservient to power or
raised up against it, any more than silences are…discourse can be both an instrument and an
effect of power, but also a hindrance…a starting point for an opposing strategy” (Foucault,
History of Sexuality, Vol. 1, 101). Just as the Internet an old media corporations created an
opposition strategy to the SOPA legislation, the American people began to side with one side or
the other based on personal motivations.
In the course of SOPA, Twitter became the propagation platform for civilian discourse.
From November 16, 2011 to April 8th, 2012, Twitter micro-bloggers posted approximately
139,194 tweets with the hash tag #SOPA, indicating that they were commenting on the SOPA
debate ("Archive on #SOPA"). Of these posts, 64.52% were original tweets (posts) on the SOPA
issue, while 35.48% were retweets (reposts) on the topic. The majority of these reposts were to
spread petitions against SOPA, using Twitter to propagate the anti-SOPA perspective of the
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discourse. A sampling of the Twitter postings elucidates the evolution of the discourse
throughout the SOPA blackout protests, and how these protests impacted public opinion. When
examining citizen Twitter posts for propagation, manipulation, and memes, it becomes clear that
the citizens had some faculty in implementing propagation and manipulations, but had no unified
message or intentional memes behind their discourse. As such, they were less effective in
establishing one, solid discourse, and instead created an amalgamation of dissenting voices
against SOPA.
Figure 10: Citizen Twitter Posts
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"confidant" of #SOPA
revival, MPAA's fmr tech
policy chief comes out
against it.
http://news.cnet.com/830
1-31921_3-57410674281/mpaas-former-techpolicy-chief-turns-sopafoe/

Propagation
Citizens using Twitter, by definition, have audiences to whom they are speaking, and thus
they are propagating a message. Given that citizens have varying backgrounds and political
believes, this set of tweets does not necessarily represent a cohesive discourse against the
government. For example, Andrea’s post on the “return of SOPA” is against SOPA inherently, as
are the majority of the civilian posts online. However, Pour Me Coffee’s comment on SOPA, retweeted by the MPAA, is more neutral in tone. Given that these individuals have varying
audience sizes, some receive more propagation of their message than others. Cory Doctorow’s
comment on SOPA, “MPAA says #SOPA blackout is "an abuse of market power," what about
having non-skippable fake FBI warnings & biased PSAs before every DVD?” has the most
retweets and favorites of any comment, but Doctorow is also a professional blogger, giving him
a readership and more experience posting tweets than most other citizens in the figure above.
This disunity of the discourse, with different citizens spreading different messages, and the
disparity between which tweets have the largest audience, means that there is not an even
propagation of a unified discourse in the population. However, the majority of tweets examined
give SOPA a negative manipulation, meaning that, taken as a whole, the citizens’ discourse on
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SOPA is inherently negative, although the reasons for disliking the act vary from free speech
issues to dislike of the MPAA and major media corporations.
Manipulation
The exaggeration of claims is the most frequent manipulation of the citizens. Allegations
of “biased PSAs,” “suits” who do not understand the Internet, and excitement over the success of
the blackouts are all rhetorical ways of manipulating the SOPA discourse away from the
government narrative. The government representatives who drafted SOPA designed it to protect
private industry. The “biased PSAS” comment attacks the private industry’s legitimacy in asking
for SOPA to be passed, hitting at the heart of the government discourse. Moreover, the
allegations that the government does not understand the Internet seeks to return power to the
citizens, who are implied to understand the Internet better than the government. The support of
the blackouts supports the Internet media’s narrative over that of the government’s, thus altering
the discourse by emphasizing one discourse over another. The issue, however, with exaggeration
as a manipulation tactic is that it is easily turned by the government. Since the civilian population
is not thinking collectively about more profound ways of confounding the government discourse,
the government in this respect has the upper hand, as it has the ability to speak with one voice
and have one cohesive manipulation strategy. Simply siding with one discourse over another, or
taking different stabs at the government from different angles, is not sufficient for the people to
commandeer the discourse from the government’s control.
Memes
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There are no cohesive memes mentioned by the people. Instead, what the tweets reflect
are haphazard criticisms that skim the surface, rarely getting to the memetic level. This absence
of memes also gives government officials the upper hand.
Looking at the Twitter posts of public figures, two facts become clear. First, as the citizen
and corporate voices began to win the discourse, representatives who were in favor of the
legislation originally changed sides after the blackouts. Second, the government had to clearly
distinct discourses on SOPA, one side in favor, one side against, and these discourse had a more
cohesive message that the citizen discourse.
Figure 11: Public Official Twitter Posts
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Propagation
In general, the government representatives receive more retweets than the civilians. The
significance of the “retweet” is that a Twitter tweet that is retweeted is now posted on another
person’s account, meaning that comment receives a wider audience than if it was just on the
poster’s Twitter feed. Thus, the government officials, having larger audiences due to their public
roles and social status, not only have wider audiences privy to their Twitter feeds, they also get
more audience members propagating their message for them. In this fashion, the government
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officials are able to spread their discourse father and more quickly than civilians, giving the
government an edge in controlling the discourse surrounding SOPA.
Manipulation
The government officials do not have a consistent stance on SOPA, either. A large reason
for the diversity of opinion has to do with the negative stances taken by citizens and Internet
corporations against SOPA. In this sense, the Internet corporations and the citizens managed to
redirect the discourse enough to gain support of those who formerly dissented. The key
manipulations of those still in favor of the legislation was claims to economic protection for
citizens, with tweets like “To stop foreign counterfeiters and protect consumers” and noting the
amount of profits lost due to copyright infringement. However, the responses by those in favor of
SOPA never touched on the freedom of speech issue brought up by the Internet corporations.
This could be one reason why SOPA failed, was the government’s inability to adapt the
discourse to reframe citizen and corporate concerns.
Memes
Economic issues became the main meme of the government discourse in favor of SOPA<
while those against took up the Internet corporation meme of freedom. Those in favor focused on
the economic arguments for SOPA, citing profit losses for citizens. The trouble with this meme,
however, was that it wasn’t very persuasive. It focused on profits of corporations, while not
addressing the key concerns of the opposition. In the meantime, representatives against SOPA
focused on aligning with the Internet corporations; thus their memes reflect this choice. From
Ron Paul’s statement that “the internet must remain free” to Tsongas “It is written too broadly
and could have an adverse affect [sic] on free speech and internet innovation,” these statements
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focus on the freedom of speech issue over economic values, aligning themselves with the
Internet side.
These representatives were wise to align with the Internet corporations. After the
blackout, during which an estimated 115,000 websites and 14 million users participated, the US
public opinion had spoken through Facebook and Twitter commentary, boycotting of the internet
and signing of petitions on We the People, the White House petition Internet forum21. The US
House of Representatives pulled SOPA from the floor after the online protests, and the Internet
companies and citizens against SOPA declared victory.

THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO SOPA’S FAILURE
SOPA did not pass into law. However, the act is not yet dead. The government has the
ability to redraft legislation and re-submit it for voting. Indeed, as one tweet noted from civilian
Andrea, the new Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act (CISPA) legislation has
overtones similar to SOPA. The distinction, however, is that CISPA is framed as an antiterrorism bill. Since CISPA seeks to target foreign governments and actors attacking Internet
sites, the Internet corporations are in favor of the legislation, making the political alignment
different than before. Moreover, there are clauses of CISPA that relate also to protecting IP
infringement. Essentially, CISPA pleases both Internet and old media corporations. Given that
Internet corporations were the true winners of the SOPA blackout, not the citizens, it is likely
that next time around, the government will succeed in passing the legislation.

21

Petition available for public reference at http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/01/14/obamaadministration-responds-we-people-petitions-sopa-and-online-piracy
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Internationally as well, the US government’s work is not done with copyright
infringement online. ACTA, the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, is still alive, and it is
moving forward internationally, with the US included. Chapter 4 will delve into this case in
greater detail.

Chapter 4: EU Case Study
Disagreement on the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
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In January 2012, 22 European Union nations signed the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement, a plurilateral agreement between the United States, Australia, Canada, Japan,
Morocco, New Zealand, Singapore, and South Korea. Immediately after signing the treaty, over
one hundred protests broke out throughout EU member nations. In the weeks that followed, the
very representatives who signed the document would reject ACTA’s ability to uphold freedom of
speech, and even the rapporteur responsible for reviewing ACTA on behalf of the Commission,
member of the European Parliament Kader Arif, quit his position as reviewer based on the
agreement’s deleterious effects on free expression in Europe. Yet, ACTA continued through the
EU government policy process, moving in April to judicial review by the European Court of
Justice. The question is, in light of the massive amount of public dissent and outcries against the
agreement, why has ACTA continued to pass government checks, coming closer and closer to
being integrated into European law? Why has freedom of speech of the people failed to change
anything in how the EU governments treat act? This case study shows that the EU government
has used discourse manipulation and governance tactics with ACTA to continue pursuing their
agenda, despite dissent from the people.
Internet Governance in the EU
The European Union’s history with the Internet is not as long as the US’s legacy, but
Europe was also an early adopter to the Internet. The EU’s stance on internet governance was
established in large part at the World Summit on Information Society (WSIS), held as a series of
meetings from 2003 to 2005, in which the EU and fellow nations set out the principles for the
Internet’s architecture and operation and for internet governance ("Internet governance" 2009).
The WSIS observed that the Internet’s architecture is built largely on the private sector and
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government support on private sector initiatives. “The private sector has been in the forefront
since the Internet began. It provides the investment, expertise and entrepreneurial initiative
which foster innovation. The private sector operates most of the international backbone
infrastructure, the national cable networks, and provides services that facilitate and manage
traffic.” From this basic premise comes the EU’s support for corporations seeking to engage in
business online. The EU sees the role of governments in Internet development as it being
“important that governments play a more active role in its development process.” After WSIS,
the EU set forth the following principles for how it plans to govern the Internet:
1. The core architecture should be respected;
2. The private sector should retain a leading role;
3. There should be multi-stakeholder participation;
4. Governments should participate more actively;
5. Inclusion should be a basic principle.
The EU concludes with the following notes: “Internet governance is an absolute priority in
terms of public policy. The EU has a leading role to play since it includes nearly 19 % of the
world’s Internet users.” These guidelines, designed to be flexible in nature so as to apply to a
wide range of issues and to grow with the Internet as it develops, set the precedent for many of
the EU’s actions regarding the Internet.
EU Governance and the Social Contract
In Chapter 1, it was established that freedom of speech is a desirable right for
governments to allow because it enhances a government’s ability to communicate and receive
comments from the people. This communication acts to strengthen the social contract that acts as
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an underpinning to the legitimacy of a government. The social contract, this mutual benefit
between powers given by the citizen to the government in exchange for the government
representing the people, is at the heart of freedom of speech for this reason. Of course, there is
the presumption here that the government is actually representing citizen interests.
The European Union is an experiment in politics, in that it is a form of government never
before seen, and there are no other governments quite like it in structure. It contains elements of
a federalist system, with its European Parliament and Court of Justice, and has checks and
balances between these branches. However, the European Commission has the monopoly on
origination of legislation, unlike the typical federalist system where the Parliament would have
this power. More importantly, the EU does not supplant the pre-existing governments of its
member nations, but its rulings and policies do impact these national governments. Since the
states maintain their sovereignty under the EU, the system cannot truly be called federalist. The
EU has been called an international organization similar to the United Nations. Yet, the EU’s
ability to legislate the member states’ policies shows that member states have ceded some
aspects of sovereignty to the EU. Other international organizations do not have this power over
their member nations. The EU, for this reason that it is part-federalist, part-international
organization, is often referred to as a supranational authority.
Since the EU has a unique governmental structure, it also has a complicated social
contract with citizens of the member states. Citizens have power in the EU government process;
they elect members to the European Parliament, and by electing their national government
officials, they also elect members of the Council of Ministers who act as a type of executive
branch. These elected national government officials also appoint the European Commission,
giving citizens indirect representation over the Commission as well. The citizens can also impact
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legislative issues through interest groups who can lobby in the system, not unlike the US
Congress system. The graphic below helps demonstrate the various avenues this social contract
is practiced in the form of representative governance.

Figure 1: Channels of public accountability in the European Union (Norris 274)

The EU has a system for representing the people, and ways for the people to use freedom
of speech to influence their government; thus, one would theorize that the social contract would
be strong in the EU. Unfortunately, many articles have been published stating the opposite,
saying that a sort of “democratic deficit” exists in the EU today. The democratic deficit theory
effectively notes that there is a breakdown of democratic representation in the EU. Part of the
breakdown involves “permissive consent,” wherein there is enough tacit support for EU
initiatives that the EU officials assume consent, or assume they can manufacture it, thereby
bypassing much of the representation process (Norris 274). As Norris explains, “the problem of
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the ‘democratic deficit’ is whether these direct and indirect channels are effective in connecting
the preferences of citizens to the outcome of EU decision-making. During the early years of the
Community the technocratic and diplomatic elite determined the direction of European
development, much as they controlled bodies such as NATO, with the tacit approval of a
permissive consensus among mass publics. The idea of a ‘permissive consensus’ implies general
support within public opinion, with passive approval which is widespread if shallowly rooted,
and which may allow future government action” (Norris 274). This legacy of representation
paved the way to a sort of government apathy on public opinion, wherein a past of good
representation has led to a current system where the voices of the people cannot impact the
governance model clearly and effectively. As a result, there have been declining voter turnout
rates for members of the European Parliament, as the people feel that their votes do not really
matter, as the system seems to make decisions without consulting the public (Malkopoulou 2).
The implications of the democratic deficit and low voter turnout is that the EU
governments can afford to focus less on the words of the people in the short-term, because the
people have less ability to immediately punish the government for not representing their needs as
demonstrated through free speech. To the average EU voter, it is unclear who the people would
penalize for passing ACTA; the Council of Ministers appoints the Commission, so should the
people vote their president or prime minister out of office? Or, should the citizens punish the
European Parliament members who approved the Council of Ministers’ delegation to the
Commission? Or, should the citizens blame the European Parliament for passing ACTA, as it
will eventually have to if ACTA is to become part of European law. As Pippa Norris notes, “The
lack of transparency about ‘who said what’ in negotiations behind the closed doors of the
Council of Ministers, and the complexity of relating policy outputs to outcomes, makes it
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extremely difficult for the public to evaluate the actions of their government within Europe”
(Norris 273). This lack of clarity of who should “be punished” for ignoring the speech of the
people means the government members are less afraid that their actions will directly lead to their
loss of power. Suddenly, the social contract, and the power of an individual’s speech, starts to
erode.
In this case, the EU does manipulate discourse to convince the people of Europe that
ACTA is in their long-term best interest. However, behind this discourse manipulation, the
government also realizes that if the people do not support ACTA, the democratic deficit creates a
safety zone for the government to pass ACTA without fear or public recourse. In essence, the
people can speak freely, but their words will not translate into government response, thus
removing much of the power of free speech in the first place.
ACTA: THE INTERNATIONAL WAR ON PIRACY
Perhaps the most salient issue in the EU regarding internet governance is the crisis in
copyright and intellectual property rights infringement. Internationally, copyright infringement
on the Internet is posing issues to most governments, since governments in countries with
developed patenting and copyright laws are bound by law to defend those patents and copyrights.
Of course, even more critical than the issue of the rule of law is the economic need to obtain
more value added from international trade. Online, it is easy for one user to share music, books,
or other copyrighted material without paying the businesses that developed said content. This
form of piracy is robbing a substantial amount of revenue from artists and distributors worldwide.
Due to the nature of copyright infringement, it is difficult to ascertain precisely how much
money is lost from Internet file-sharing; after all, the issue is so rampant, and notoriously
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difficult to track ("Anti-counterfeiting trade agreement," 2012). However, organizations like the
Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), the Recording Industry Association of
America (RIAA), and countless distributors and creators of content in Europe are no longer
willing to tolerant the loss of profits from piracy. From this frustration and this new frontier of
intellectual property law, the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) came into being.
This paper will be examining copyright infringement in the EU as a critical aspect of
internet governance and internet policy for the EU in the 21st century. However, in order to win
this battle, the EU must reframe the current discourse surrounding ACTA. At present, ACTA is
seen as a threat to the status quo in the Internet world, where copyrights are still poorly enforced.
In order to placate a population that fears for its freedom of speech, the EU will need to change
the tone of the discourse surrounding this agreement if it is to successfully implement ACTA.
This paper will examine, through discourse analysis, how the discourse surrounding ACTA has
evolved, and will then show how the EU is taking steps to alter the discourse in the EU
government’s favor.
The ACTA case study will focus, through the lens of discourse analysis, on the discourse
as seen from five perspectives; the ACTA agreement itself, the opinions of the EU government,
European news media perspectives, the public, as represented by the hacker group Anonymous,
and international news reporting. Discourse analysis, focusing on manipulations, propagation
and memes, will reveal that the EU government initially lost the battle to control the discourse on
ACTA by failing to appropriate proper propagation techniques; however, through the use of
memes and manipulation, the EU will manage to regain public favor.
A Brief Overview of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
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The most recent intervention on intellectual property rights (IPR) infringement in the
European Union is the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA). ACTA is frequently
compared to the US bill, the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA), but these two documents have
some substantial differences in both scope and content. While it is true that SOPA and ACTA
both focus on IPR infringement online, and while both the EU and the US are signatories of
ACTA, the similarities stop there. SOPA was a bill in the US Congress, designed to be legally
binding only in the United States. ACTA, meanwhile, is an agreement signed in 2007 by the
United States, Australia, Canada, Japan, Morocco, New Zealand, Singapore, and South Korea,
with the European Union, Mexico, and Switzerland committing to signing the agreement “as
soon as practicable” (Galperin, 2011). On February 11, 2012, the EU formally signed ACTA, and
pending review by the European Parliament, ACTA will become an agreement to which the EU
member states are legally bound.
In order to properly analyze the discourse on ACTA, it is imperative to establish what the
ACTA agreement’s text actually says that ACTA will do. Chapter I: Initial Provisions and
General Definitions describes ACTA’s scope as well as its relationship to past agreements, like
the TRIPS agreement. The first chapter notes that past obligations from prior agreements stand
and ACTA will apply only to intellectual property rights existing in the signing countries at the
time of signature. Individual nations can choose to impose stronger or harsher measures than
ACTA demands but cannot opt to ignore aspects of ACTA that are part of the treaty.
Chapter II: Legal Framework For Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights is
comprised of five sections. Section 1: General Obligations (Article 6: General Obligations with
Respect to Enforcement) sets out the various obligations and requirements to implement ACTA
into law in various countries, and to create a fair procedure for following through on ACTA’s
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provisions. Section 2: Civil Enforcement focuses on the rights holders of IPR, saying that “Each
Party shall make available to right holders civil judicial procedures concerning the enforcement
of any intellectual property right as specified in this Section” and that judges have the ability "to
issue an order against a party to desist from an infringement" ("Anti-counterfeiting trade
agreement," 2009). Article 9 states that “In determining the amount of damages for infringement
of intellectual property rights, a Party’s judicial authorities shall have the authority to consider,
inter alia, any legitimate measure of value the right holder submits, which may include lost
profits, the value of the infringed goods or services measured by the market price, or the
suggested retail price.” Article 10 specifies that the rights holder may ask to have pirated
copyright goods and counterfeit trademark goods destroyed. Section 3: Border Measures
essentially puts in place a system for checking computer files moving between EU and
international borders at airports.
Section 4: Criminal Enforcement focuses on the criminal nature of copyright
infringements in criminal cases, as opposed to civil. Article 23: Criminal Offenses sets forth the
basic principle that "willful trademark counterfeiting or copyright or related rights piracy on a
commercial scale" is punishable under criminal law. Article 24: Penalties states that the criminal
system should "include imprisonment as well as monetary fines" as punishments for IPR
infringement. Section 5: Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in the Digital Environment
puts forth methods for IPR protection in the digital world as opposed to the physical. In this
section, the ACTA writers include the statement that digital networks must be managed by the
signers of ACTA in a way that "preserves fundamental principles such as freedom of expression,
fair process, and privacy”. This line is clearly meant to assuage the fears of oppression of
freedom of speech.
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Chapter III: Enforcement Practices focuses on how ACTA will concretely be enforced by
the signing countries. This chapter encourages joint actions by the member states, and
encourages the collection of statistical data to limit infringement. Article 29: Management of
Risk at Border allows for information from border checks on computers to be shared, saying that
“Information, including but not limited to information that assists in identifying and targeting
suspicious shipments, may be shared between parties for the purposes of border enforcement.
Should an importing party seize infringing goods, it may supply such information to assist an
exporting party in pursuing infringers”. Chapter IV: International Cooperation focuses on
information sharing and creating technical assistance mechanisms for the ACTA agreement.
Chapter V: Institutional Arrangements creates the ACTA committee to enforce the
ACTA initiatives. In Article 36, the ACTA committee is charged with reviewing “the
implementation and operation of this Agreement” and deciding “in accordance with paragraph 2
of Article 43 (Accession), upon the terms of accession to this Agreement of any Member of the
WTO.” All ACTA committee decisions are done by consensus. Chapter VI: Final Provisions
includes some final notes on formalities for the treaty, but have no important policy implications.
In short, ACTA is designed to create an international focus on piracy of copyrighted
content, and demand that Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and Internet companies avoid piracy,
with strict repercussions.
ACTA Discourse in Five Perspectives
In order to trace how the EU government has attempted to shape the discourse
surrounding ACTA, this case study will examine five perspectives: the EU government
representatives in favor of ACTA, the EU government representatives against it, the citizens’
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opinion, the EU media’s perspective, and the international media perspective. In examining these
perspectives, data such as government publications, news articles, and Twitter posts will be
considered for their rhetorical implementation of manipulations, memes, and their propagation
value as determined by the size of the audience observing the commentary. In selection Twitter
data, only EU citizens with original Twitter posts were considered for examination. No retweets,
or responses to other Twitter posts, were examined, and no individuals outside the EU were
considered.
Looking first at the government perspective, through examining public announcements, it
is clear that the government for ACTA wished to emphasize protection of freedom of speech in
its rhetoric from the very beginning. According to European Commissioner Karel De Gucht, the
commissioner focusing on EU trade and the EU representative most closely associated with
ACTA’s signing, ACTA was designed to protect freedom of speech, not infringe upon it. De
Gucht stated on January 1, 2012, that “ACTA does not contain any provisions mandating the
monitoring of the internet by private companies,” thereby undermining the opposition’s
manipulation on the discourse of freedom of speech. He also notes that “For instance, it complies
with the 2009 Telecom Framework Directive which guarantees the protection of the universality
of the internet in accordance with the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, as
guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms and general principles of EU law and now by the European Union's Charter of
Fundamental Rights” ("Anti-counterfeiting trade agreement," 2012). By invoking past legal
frameworks, and therefore invoking the discourse of freedom of speech in law that is considered
“appropriate” by the EU citizens, de Gucht is grounding ACTA in the discourse of appropriate
legal steps taken to protect copyrights. Despite this rhetorical attempt to steer the discourse in
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favor of ACTA, de Gucht was unsuccessful. Despite having been signed by 22 EU nations,
ACTA has a substantial discourse surrounding it that does not support the agreement. Currently,
ACTA has been received poorly by the public, several government representatives, and Internetbased corporations.
The EU media has been active in propagating a more negative discourse surrounding
ACTA, being quick to manipulate the discourse surrounding the votes in favor of ACTA. One
Economist article from February 11th uses this paragraph to describe the mood surrounding
ACTA in the EU’s government:
No sooner was the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) signed than
Kader Arif, the European Union’s chief negotiator, called it a “masquerade” and
resigned. Slovenia’s envoy, who signed the deal at a powwow in Japan, called her
own behaviour an act of “civic carelessness”. Romania’s prime minister (now
resigned) admitted he couldn’t say why his country had signed it. In Poland,
where lawmakers protested by wearing Guy Fawkes masks associated with the
Anonymous hacker-activist collective, the prime minister said he would suspend
ratification. The Czech Republic and Slovakia (which has not signed it) later did
the same. ("ACTA up," 2012)
This ACTA response set forth by the Economist, one of the most-read news publications
in the world, is founded upon the delegates’ inherent dislike for ACTA. This is an alteration on
the ACTA discourse first established by de Gucht and the drafters of ACTA. The original
creators of ACTA preach that this was an agreement that will benefit all nations and support
copyrights worldwide. Here, the news media within the EU is selling a different story. The first
manipulation occurs; the Economist article’s language indicates that since the delegates don’t
support ACTA, the citizens should call this agreement into question. By portraying the
reluctance of the delegates, instead of just the fact that the agreement was signed, the Economist
article changes the perspective of the agreement. The discourse on ACTA goes from the
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agreement being a step in the right direction for copyrights, to being an act of “civic
carelessness.”
The Economist was not wrong about there being dissent in the government concerning
ACTA; not only delegates, but also the Data Protection Supervisor who is charged with
evaluating privacy online, does not support ACTA in its current form. As the European Data
Protection Supervisor Mr. Peter Hustinx, charged with “protecting personal data and privacy and
promoting good practice in the EU institutions and bodies,” ("European Data Protection
Supervisor," 2012) noted in his official stance on ACTA in July of 2010 that this agreement has
the ability to impact freedom of speech profoundly:
Such practices are highly invasive in the individuals’ private sphere. They entail
the generalised monitoring of Internet users’ activities, including perfectly lawful
ones. They affect millions of law-abiding Internet users, including many children
and adolescents. They are carried out by private parties, not by law enforcement
authorities. Moreover, nowadays, the Internet plays a central role in almost all
aspects of modern life, thus, the effects of disconnecting Internet access may be
enormous, cutting individuals off from work, culture, eGovernment applications,
etc.” ("Opinion of the," 2010)
Thus the discourse receives another manipulation: the individual responsible for
evaluating this agreement fears that it has dangerous implications for surveillance of civilians.
The propagation of this statement is quite large, given that this document is freely accessible on
the Internet. However, it is not as publicly broadcasted as the Economist piece or the ACTA
agreement. Also, the memes that this discourse manipulation calls into question are those
surrounding freedom of speech and privacy, both quite sacred to EU citizens. The EU Data
Protection Supervisor created the report with the intention of fairly evaluating ACTA; however,
his evaluation does impact the discourse, in this case, further questioning the effect ACTA could
have on privacy and free speech in the EU.
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Public opinion in Europe has not been in favor of the legislation. The hacker group,
Anonymous, created a video on YouTube, implementing visual and verbal rhetoric to persuade
the public to oppose ACTA (Anonymous, 2012). They use an analogy where, under ACTA, if
you learned a recipe in a cooking class, but then shared it with your wife, then you would be
liable to be held accountable for pirating copyrighted material. Anonymous notes that this system
would require ISPs to constantly check content, or their whole sites could be shut down. Under
this system, according to Anonymous, “the internet as we know it is on the brink of destruction.”
Anonymous takes its example to the extreme, proposing that lawsuits will not help content
creators, because “parts of sentences can be protected” under copyright. Anonymous calls out the
“content mafia,” namely the RIAA and MPAA, who are restricting freedom of speech for the
sake of their “obsolete business model.” In the end, Anonymous calls ACTA a massive piece of
corporate lobbying, and calls on the people of Europe and the world to “Stop the Kraken.”
International news media sources have not been much kinder to ACTA. Russia Today on
March 3, 2012, showed that the ACTA response has been overwhelmingly negative. Focused on
the shutdown of pirated content site RnBXclusive.com by the Serious Organized Crime Agency
(SOCA), this news piece highlights some of the surveillance and disciplining methods used by
Britain in the name of ACTA (Russia Today, 2012). When SOCA shut down RnBXclusive.com,
a website that provided illegally uploaded music for downloading, it did not just removed the site;
it left a message as a warning, saying “If you have downloaded music using this website you
may have committed a criminal offence which carries a maximum penalty of up to 10 years
imprisonment and an unlimited fine under UK law.” As Russia Today notes “ten year offenses”
are of a serious ilk, for crimes such as “rape, manslaughter, not usually for downloading music
illegally”. What makes this case truly intriguing is that SOCA is typically involved with larger
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acts of organized crime and has not been typically associated with copyright infringement. As
Andrew Pierson of the Howard League for Penal Reform notes “If this is what they are labeling
serious organized crime…what happened to the Mob, the Mafia? Drug Dealing? As far as I think
the public are concerned, that crime is still happening on our streets.” SOCA’s explanation for
the behavior states that the organization on a whole “targets organized criminal enterprises
profiting from the exploitation of the UK public and legitimate businesses. Much of the music
offered for download by the rnbxclusive.com website was illegally obtained from artists, leading
the industry to attribute losses of approximately 15 million pounds per year to the site’s activity.”
In other words, according to the Guardian of February 17th, SOCA has announced, through both
its actions and through public statements, that it has moved into a new arena of organized crime;
that of copyright infringement online (Halliday, 2012). UK citizens are concerned about this new
direction. As Loz Kaye of the Pirate Party stated in an interview with Russia Today, this change
in SOCA’s mission means that UK citizens “can be monitored and tracked.” On a more personal
note, he added, “I’m afraid we are going to see this kind of abuse on an industrial scale if ACTA
comes to pass.” Perhaps most interestingly, SOCA took down the original threat. By way of
explanation, Russia Today stated that “Internet campaigners say the message was meant to
frighten, and in reality severe penalties couldn’t be applied to casual downloaders.” In a tactic
that is straight out of Foucault’s Discipline and Punish, the government gave the appearance of
set a punishment, a ten year prison sentence, which was meant to encourage self-regulation by
the public. The furor that resulted showed that the punishment was questioned by the people;
however, the concern this move generated showed that the government succeeded in sending a
warning to the public.
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The EU citizens on Twitter have closely followed the developments of ACTA. Looking
at the figure below, a sampling of ten Twitter posts shows the progression of ACTA through the
EU governance system, and the citizens’ perspective on the discourse. These posts were selected
for originality of content (no retweets from other users were selected), relevance to the topic area,
and only EU citizens were included in the sample group. These twitter posts reflect, through
manipulations, propagation, and memes, a largely negative sentiment surrounding ACTA.

Figure 2: Citizen Twitter Posts Concerning the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
Date

Name

Comment Text

Jan.
26,
2012

Laurent
Bauvens22

#ACTA #MustRead "Un
calendrier accéléré pour faire
passer l'accord avant que
l'opinion publique ne soit
alertée."
http://www.numerama.com/m
agazine/21424-actademissionnaire-kader-arifdenonce-une-mascarade.html

Numbe Number
r of Re- of
tweets Favorite
s
0
0

Link
to
Webpage
Yes

Side of
Discour
se

0

Yes

AntiACTA

AntiACTA

-Link reports that MEP Kader
Arif resigned from ACTA
rapporteur position
Translation: ACTA # #
MustRead "An accelerated
schedule for passing the
agreement before the public
is alerted.
Jan
31,
2012

22
23

Michael
Clausen23

Stop Internet #Censorship!
Sign the urgent global petition
@Avaaz urging the EU
Parliament to reject #ACTA:
https://secure.avaaz.org/en/e

https://twitter.com/#!/bauvens/statuses/162581255563657216
https://twitter.com/#!/michaelclausen/status/164337834130550785

88

0

Feb
2,
2012

Louis
Papaemman
uel24

Feb.
22,
2012

Chris Abela25

Mar.
23,
2012

Balthasar
Glättli26

Mar.
26,
2012

Mar.
27,
2012

Joan
Roussouliere
27

Oliver
Grimm28

u_save_the_internet_spread/
?wjRxIcb
-links to petition against
ACTA
Citizens from all over the
world are signing the Stop
#ACTA #petition, 1 signatory
every 2 secs - next goal: 2
Million
Individuals in favour of
#ACTA, should be free to
adopt it, others should be free
to opt out.
@francoiseleste @thonixx
@CarloSommaruga das
anonymous video ist nicht
up2date und schadet der
seriösen #acta Kritik eher,
weil übertrieben.
Translation: @ @
francoiseleste thonixx @
anonymous CarloSommaruga
the video is not serious and
detrimental to the up2date #
acta criticism because it is
exaggerated.
Debat sur #ACTA a Sciences
Po commence avec
commission europeenne,
parti pirate finlandais,
@laquadrature et PPE.
Translation: Debate on ACTA
# begins with Sciences Po
European commission,
Finnish Pirate Party, and
laquadrature @ EPP.
#ACTA Ausschuss für
Internationalen Handel im
#Europaparlament stimmt
dagegen, den ACTA-Text
dem Gerichtshof der EU
vorzulegen.

24

0

0

Yes

AntiACTA

0

0

No

AntiACTA

0

0

No

Nonspecific

1

0

No

Nonspecific

0

0

No

NonSpecific,
slightly
AntiACTA

https://twitter.com/#!/louis_gov2u/status/165053994367070208
https://twitter.com/#!/AbelaChris/status/172258795748200448
26
https://twitter.com/#!/bglaettli/status/183247653478481921
27
https://twitter.com/#!/jaralive/statuses/184330807488421889
28
https://twitter.com/#!/grimmse/status/184631657280704513

25
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April
2,
2012

Ahmed
ShihabEldin29

April
4,
2012

Felix
Treguer30

April
5,
2012

Frédéric
Couchet31

Translation: # ACTA
Committee on International
Trade in the # European
Parliament votes against the
ACTA text submitted to the
Court of the EU.
#ACTA (Anti-Counterfeiting
Trade Agreement) - the
worldwide #SOPA could be
passed within 10 weeks read all about it.
http://www.akascope.com/20
12/04/02/acta-passed-10weeks-action-late/
#ACTA RT @EDRi_org: 40
days for the European
Commission to come up with
22 words
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressR
eleasesAction.do?reference=I
P/12/354&format=HTML&age
d=0&language=EN&guiLangu
age=en
-link to European
Commission decision to refer
ACTA to Court of Justice
-“22 words” refers to this
question for the Court: "Is the
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement (ACTA)
compatible with the European
Treaties, in particular with the
Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European
Union?"
RT @laquadrature EU
Commission Shamelessly
Persists In Trying to Delay
ACTA Vote
https://www.laquadrature.net/
node/5615

29

3

1

Yes

Rhetoric
ally nonspecific,
implied
AntiACTA

1

0

Yes

AntiSOPA

1

0

Yes

AntiACTA

https://twitter.com/#!/ASE/status/186868600932532224
https://twitter.com/#!/FelixTreguer/statuses/187573454768320513
31
https://twitter.com/#!/fcouchet/status/187836702616846336

30
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The Twitter posts show little diversity in perspective surrounding ACTA; most posts are
either against ACTA, or are merely stating facts surrounding the development of the agreement
as it passed through the Commission to the European Parliament to the Court of Justice, where is
it is being considered at the time this chapter is being written.
Propagation:
Notably, the posts receiving more retweets were originally posted in the latter part of
March and in early April, when the agreement was contentiously offered to the EU Court of
Justice for consideration instead of being voted down in the European Parliament. Three of the
Twitter posts were for petitions to stop ACTA; interestingly, none were retweeted, meaning no
one in the Twitter community wanted to spread the word about the petitions. Retweeting is a
very literal example of propagation; the more retweets a post has, the more people spread the
tweet throughout the Twitter community, and the wider an audience the tweet has. The fact that
these petitions did not receive retweets mean that there were less audience members privy to that
side of the discourse.
Manipulation:
The best example of manipulation by a citizen in a tweet was by Frédéric Couchet, who
misrepresented the decision to take ACTA to the Court of Justice. His claim is that the “EU
Commission Shamelessly Persists In Trying to Delay ACTA Vote,” and cites an article that
claims the Commission pursued the Court of Justice even after one subcommittee in the
European Parliament voted against ACTA going to the Court of Justice. If the government
explanation is valid, then this claim is a manipulation. The government’s explanation, as cited in
an article in Tayebot’s tweet (See Figure 3), is that this subcommittee voted to not have ACTA
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go to the Court of Justice because it would be redundant, since the Commission already planned
to send the agreement to the Court for consideration. This explanation obviously differs
drastically from the discourse given by Mr. Couchet. Mr. Couchet and the article he cites are not
wrong, per se; rather, they manipulate the facts to make it sound as though the government is
delaying the vote. Thus, this is a significant manipulation of the discourse.
Memes:
These Twitter posts by citizens, while engaging with ACTA as it progresses, do not
engage as much with the memes behind it. One person tweeted to “Stop Internet #Censorship,”
which hails back to a common meme in the ACTA discourse, that of freedom of speech
infringement and the sacredness of uninhibited speech. Aside from that comment, most posts
merely noted updated on ACTA’s progress, or asked other Twitter members to sign petitions
against ACTA without specifying memetic reasons for rejecting the agreement. This absence of
memes in the citizen Twitter discourse differs significantly from the government discourse,
which relies heavily on such memetic rhetorical devices to gain public support.
The EU government officials have been very vocal on Twitter concerning ACTA, as
social media became the discourse battleground for winning public opinion. Below is a data
sample of eight Twitter postings by government officials in the EU. Through discourse
propagation, manipulation, and memes, the EU officials portray a positive picture of ACTA’s
potential influence on the EU’s economic prosperity. While some remain more neutral, none
outright challenge the validity of ACTA as an agreement.
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Figure 3: Public Official Twitter Posts
Date

Name

Comment Text

Numbe Number
r of Re- of
tweets Favorite
s
27
0

Link
to
Web
page
No

Jan.
30,
2012

Neelie
Kroes, Vice
President of
the
European
Commission

#ACTA is not #SOPA, ACTA
does not change EU law. but
EU law on copyright can
certainly be improved!

John Clancy,
Spokesperso
n for EU
Trade
Commission
er Karel De
Gucht 33
Daniel
Caspary,
Member of
European
Parliament34

Commissioner De Gucht on
#ACTA: "This is not 1984; this
is 2012. ACTA is not 'Big
Brother'. It's about solving our
today's economic problems"

1

1

No

ProACTA

ab jetzt Debatte zu #ACTA mit
Kommissar de Gucht im #EPAußenhandelsausschuss
#INTA #EP

0

0

No

Nonspecific

4

1

Yes

NonSpecific

8

3

Yes

ProACTA

2

0

No

Nonspecific

Side of
Discour
se
ProACTA

32

Feb.
23,
2012

Feb.
29,
2012

Mar.
1,
2012

European
Parliament
Twitter35

Mar.
5,
2012

John Clancy,
Spokesperso
n for EU
Trade
Commission
er Karel De
Gucht 36

Mar.
7,

Daniel
Caspary,

Translation: Starting now, #
ACTA debate with
Commissioner de Gucht in the
# EP Foreign Trade Committee
INTA # # EP
#ACTA workshop at #EP,
citizens speak now, live
-link to live debates, now dead
link
Don't believe the hype, read the
actual #ACTA text yourselves
http://register.consilium.europa.
eu/pdf/en/11/st12/st12196.en11
.pdf
and in all #EUlanguages
-Links to the Council of the
European Commission’s
version of the ACTA
freue mich auf die Diskussion
über #ACTA mit @netzpolitik,

32

https://twitter.com/#!/NeelieKroesEU/statuses/163984611813236739
https://twitter.com/#!/EUJohnClancy/status/174907741532471297
34
https://twitter.com/#!/caspary/status/174907906540584960
35
https://twitter.com/#!/Europarl_EN/statuses/175245442689409024
36
https://twitter.com/#!/EUJohnClancy/status/176693371534966785

33
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2012

Mar.
27,
2012

Mar.
28,
2012

Member of
European
Parliament37

Greens in
the EP,
Twitter
account for
Green Party
of
Parliament38
“Tayebot”;
Digital Media
Co-ordinator
at European
Parliament.
39

@petertauber und @tj_tweets
um 1600 im Bundestag. #EP
Translation: I look forward to
discussing with @ # ACTA
network policy, and @ @ peter
deaf tj_tweets at 1600 in the
Bundestag. # EP
#ACTA ratification process
continues as normal so far.
Watch the debate in the lead
EP trade committee
http://bit.ly/H6ScWq #ACTA
-link to live debates, now dead
link
#ACTA: reasons for committee
vote against referral to Court of
Justice
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
news/en/pressroom/content/20
120327IPR41978/html/ACTAreasons-for-committee-voteagainst-referral-to-Court-ofJustice

2

0

Yes

ProACTA

0

0

Yes

Nonspecific

Propagation:
The government tweets received over double the number of retweets of the civilians. This
propagation difference is not surprising; as noted in Chapter 1, the more power an individual has,
the better they are able to propagate their message. While power is one explanation for the
increased propagation, another reason is that these officials are the sole purveyors of what is
occurring behind closed doors in European Parliament and EU Commission meetings. While
citizens largely represent their personal opinions on ACTA in their Twitter posts, the EU
government officials provide updates on ACTA, with some manipulation and memetic devices

37

https://twitter.com/#!/caspary/status/177373106783002624
https://twitter.com/#!/GreensEP/statuses/184545278123184128
39
https://twitter.com/#!/Tayebot/status/184932363707490304

38
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woven into the factual reporting. For this reason, more people on Twitter are likely to repost the
government tweets, since these tweets offer valuable information not available elsewhere.
Manipulation:
The majority of these Twitter posts focus on the pro-ACTA or non-specified sides of the
debate. The non-specified tweets did not have significant discourse-related manipulation; they
typically noted what was occurring as ACTA moved through the EU governance process. The
observation that debates occurred or that negotiations happened is not a manipulation, as these
events did occur. However, the pro-ACTA side of the discourse had some manipulations present
in their rhetoric. Neelie Kroes’s observation that “ACTA is not SOPA” was a manipulation
designed to distance ACTA from the failing SOPA legislation that, as of January 30th, was
predicted to not pass in the House of Representatives. At that point, the SOPA blackouts had
already swayed public opinion on SOPA, and the blackouts reached the attention of an
international audience. By disassociating SOPA and ACTA, Kroes’s rhetoric manipulated the
discourse on ACTA to further remove it from SOPA’s negative press.
Memes:
John Clancy’s tweet most directly references the meme of freedom of speech. His
comment that “ACTA is not ‘Big Brother’” refers to George Orwell’s 1984, a work of literature
known for a government that limits all personal freedoms, and is known for its surveillance of
the population’s every move. George Orwell’s government, in fact, is an excellent literary
example of the panoptic state and a surveillance model taken to an extreme. By invoking the
language of “Big Brother,” Clancy touches upon this meme, the subconscious reference to this
classic work of European literature. By noting this meme and then drawing attention instead to
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“today’s economic problems” redirects the public’s attention from one meme to another, from
freedom of speech to economic issues.

Conclusions on the European Union Government’s Next Moves

Through all of this negative press, ACTA was still signed by 22 European Union nations,
and still made it to the Court of Justice for further judicial consideration. How did this uprising
of public opinion fail to stop ACTA at any of these points in time? After all, the governments of
the EU cannot ignore their people indefinitely. In large part, the governments are acting in terms
of the long-term interest of their people vis a vis the economy. With the economic instability in
Europe, the governments are looking for some area of economic activity that can be improved.
Copyrights are one such arena. Moreover, ACTA is still moving forward because the EU has not
given up on persuading the public that it is the right move for copyrights online.
First, the EU is firing back with its own web campaign. With actions consisting largely of
responses from the EU Commissioner for trade during countless interviews, the EU’s
representatives are fighting back with their own reframing of the discourse. In a response to the
criticisms launched against ACTA, de Gucht responded after February 22, 2012, to the
accusations of outside parties. He notes that “ACTA will not censor the internet. It will not
mandate monitoring of individuals e-mails or blogs. It will not subcontract the functions of the
police to private internet service providers. It will not restrict the sale of legal generic medicines.
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It will not mandate the inspection of laptops or MP3 players by customs officials” (de Gucht,
2012). By going down the list of some of the more serious allegations against the agreement, du
Gucht is directly counteracting the many manipulations on the ACTA discourse, reversing some
of the negative effects by naming the issues directly, and by saying turning “not said” rhetoric
into “said” rhetoric. He also invokes a manipulation of his own, observing that he, personally, is
“a lawyer by training, a liberal democrat by conviction and a lifelong advocate of human rights
and individual liberties.” By associating himself with liberal ideology and individual liberties, he
calls upon memes in the collective psyche that negate the criticism of ACTA, which he supports.
He also lists his past contributions to acts that are associated with free speech, once again calling
upon memes that are associated with those opposed to ACTA: “As a fairly young MEP, I was
one of those contributing to the Spinelli Report, drafting the first tentative catalogue of human
rights which in 1989 formed the basis of the European Parliament's Declaration of Fundamental
Rights and Freedoms. This is the predecessor of the EU's fundamental rights charter which has
become binding law with the Treaty of Lisbon.” By performing these acts of invoking memes
and manipulations, de Gucht counteracts some of the discourse manipulation done by the media
and citizens of the EU.
The main issue with ACTA is that the citizens of the EU clearly do not support it, yet the
agreement is proceeding through the EU governance process. True, moving the agreement to the
Court of Justice can be claimed to be a defensive move on the part of the EU Commission at de
Gucht’s request, a political maneuver to both give the discourse time to cool and to gain the
legitimate backing of the Courts that ACTA is in the spirit of EU freedom of speech laws. Yet,
paradoxically, the real threat to freedom of speech is not from ACTA itself; it is from the EU
government that continues to ignore the voices of dissent and to reframe the discourse, depriving
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the people of the ability to alter the government’s plans. In this manner, it is clear that the EU
saw the dissenters through protests, or through Twitter. After watching in a surveillance model of
discourse collection, the government then addressed the biggest memetic concerns, those
pertaining to freedom of speech, through discourse manipulations in government publications
and government Twitter posts, as well as by seeking the Court’s opinion. In essence, the
government manipulated the discourse such that ACTA still exists as a potential EU plurilateral
agreement, ignoring the words spoken in the name of free expression by thousands of European
citizens.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
Regime Types and Internet Governance

Freedom of speech, as these cases have shown, is not as simple a concept as the West
commonly portrays. In America, the term is thrown around carelessly, spoken in a single breath,
given barely a second thought. In China, the concept of freedom of speech carries an entirely
different meaning due to disparate political history. In the European Union, the citizens of the
EU take for granted that they possess complete control over their freedom of speech. This thesis
shows that freedom of speech is more complex than we perceive it to be. Freedom of speech is
used in common conversation as a construct, another meme in the discourse of power, as we saw
in Chapters 3 and 4. More importantly, though, freedom of speech as a governance issue is
ultimately in the hands of the government to control, to allow or not allow. It is in the best
interest of the government to control speech as much as they can, and it is in the interest of the
people to persuade the government to give them as much leeway for speech as possible.
However, just because the government allows the people to speak, it does not mean that the
people’s speech is entirely “free” from governmental framing on the discourse. In this way,
freedom of speech is not entirely “free.”
The Wenzhou train crash and the SOPA/PIPA and ACTA cases, on the surface, do not
seem to share many commonalities. Aside from happening within a year of each other, each
example took place in very different political and economic climates under a totalitarian regime,
a republic, and a supranational authority. Looking from a bird’s-eye view, these cases seem
dissimilar. However, when considering the root issue, that of how governments seek to control
freedom of speech through the Internet, these three issues suddenly become deeply
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interconnected. At the heart of all three lie governments seeking to gain political control of
microblogging platforms, pursuing control of discourse in a world where discourses are as
mercurial as the Internet medium through which they are disseminated. From these cases, the
manner in which the Chinese and Western governments are interacting with the Internet is
determined largely by three factors: positive and negative rights, the type of regime the
government represents, and the need to maintain governmental oversight of discourse.
Underlying all of these issues is that the Chinese government prefers to emphasize
positive rights, while the Western governments prefer to emphasize negative rights. Positive
rights are defined as what a government can provide its citizens. Food, shelter, and healthcare are
all examples of positive right. China has a long legacy of prioritizing these kinds of rights. From
Liu Shaoqi to Mao Zedong, great Chinese political leaders for thousands of years have felt that
the ability to provide for ones citizens is central to governance. On the other hand, negative
rights have not enjoyed the same consideration under Chinese governments. Negative rights are
loosely defined as those rights which the government is prohibited from infringing upon.
Freedom of speech is such a negative right, as governments here are prohibited from stopping
citizens from speaking their mind. Freedom of religion and assembly, freedom from unwarranted
searches and seizures, these are all negative rights. Looking at the Legalism era in Chinese
history, continuing through the Maoist crackdowns on political dissent, negative rights have not
been considered an important aspect of governance. Even in the modern day, the Chinese
government under Hu Jintao further notes in international conferences and academic and
political papers that China is focused first on positive rights and secondarily, if at all, on negative
rights. The implications of this emphasis on positive over negative rights are that the Chinese
government can infringe on freedom of speech, and then explain to its citizens that the
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government is doing so in order to provide superior positive rights. The perfect example of this
dynamic is the Chinese government explanation of its Internet censorship as a function of its
need to deliver improved economic performance and to stop rioting and violence throughout the
nation.
In the West, both positive and negative rights are considered central to a person’s human
rights; however, negative rights are heavily emphasized in the West, especially in comparison
with China. Positive rights are doubtlessly valued in Western culture; the Geneva Convention
and centuries of political theorists have established that fact. Negative rights are also highly
valued; the EU treaties and the US Declaration of Independence, Bill of Rights, and Constitution
are all built on the principles of negative and positive rights being integral in the governance
process. As standards of living increase in Western nations, positive rights have been fulfilled to
greater levels of citizen satisfaction; thus, the attention in governance has shifted to focus more
on negative rights. Today, negative rights in the West are considered central to the Western
governance process.
The government’s theoretical relationship with positive and negative rights impacts its
practical relationship with censorship, and thus changes how it governs the Internet. As these
case studies have shown, the Chinese government does not try to hide its censorship, while the
US and the EU clearly take steps to call their control of speech anything else but censorship.
More importantly, all their manipulations on the discourse focus on actively monitoring the
discourse, but they do not have the option of silencing internet conversations through censorship
unless the safety of the nation can be claimed to be involved. This difference clearly goes back to
these countries’ relationships with negative rights. The Chinese government does not claim to
make negative rights a priority; thus, when confronted with examples of Chinese government
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censorship, the government’s reply is often framed in terms of the positive rights being gained by
censorship, with more safety and a better quality of life being maintained through the regime’s
control. In the West, censorship has a negative connotation; the EU and the US government
cannot simply admit they censor certain material without recourse from its citizens. Typically, as
can be seen from the Freedom of Information Act’s exceptions, the US government frames
censorship as occurring only when citizens’ lives are in danger ("US Department of State
Information Access Guide”). This, too, is an example of the government using positive rights to
explain a violation of negative rights; however, the scope of excuses the US government can
make using positive rights is narrower than China, because the US government claims to highly
value negative rights. As major proponents of freedom of speech around the world, the EU and
the US governments lose face when they are accused of censorship.
Let’s take a step back from the rhetoric surrounding censorship and recognize that the EU,
the US, and China all engage in active shaping of discourses online. Sometimes, even the EU
and US government “censor” citizen speech if it is perceived as compromising the safety of the
nation. Complete freedom of access to all information is not an attainable goal in any
government; if such a society did exist, that government would have no military secrets, no
ability to operate with any degree of secrecy. Given that complete information disclosure is not
the goal, the rational understanding of access to information in the US is that the following
categories of information must remain secret, while all else is disclosed:
1) Classified information for national defense or foreign policy;
2) Internal personnel rules and practices;
3) Information that is exempt under other laws;
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4) Trade secrets and confidential business information;
5) Inter-agency or intra-agency memoranda or letters that are protected by legal
privileges;
6) Personnel and medical files;
7) Law enforcement records or information;
8) Information concerning bank supervision; and
9) Geological and geophysical information. ("US Department of State Information
Access Guide”)
At the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) in 2003 and 2005, both the EU
and the US affirmed the Declaration of Principles presented. One of the key portions of that
document is the section which reads as follows:
We reaffirm, as an essential foundation of the Information Society, and as
outlined in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, that
everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; that this right
includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and
impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.
Communication is a fundamental social process, a basic human need and the
foundation of all social organization. It is central to the Information Society.
Everyone, everywhere should have the opportunity to participate and no one
should be excluded from the benefits the Information Society offers.

Thus, both the EU and the US have affirmed the desire to maximize availability to
information. However, both the EU and the US have engaged in censorship that infringes on
these rights. For examples of this behavior, see Chapter 3. Thus, the existence of censorship is
clearly present.
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In the cases of the Wenzhou train crash, SOPA, and ACTA, all three look like examples
of where the governments failed to control the public, at least on the surface. However, in all
three cases, the government was the victor. Sure, the public has not forgotten the conflict.
However, the government in all three cases was allowed to pursue its agenda, albeit through
another avenue of policymaking. In the case of the Wenzhou train crash, fast-speed trains are
still successfully operating in China because the government was able to convince its citizens
that safety protocols were initiated post-crash to remedy the situation. To date, no actual changes
to the high-speed system have been publicly announced, but there are promises that such changes
are in the works. Whether that is true or not, only time will tell. The rhetorical effect, however,
has been that the government has placated the media, both national and international, and the
netizens of China.
In the case of SOPA, the legislation never passed. However, the US government is still
actively pursuing alternatives to SOPA, through CISPA and ACTA. Relative to SOPA, ACTA is
receiving little to no media attention in the US a mere two months after SOPA was pulled from
Congress. The American public has been publishing fewer and fewer Twitter and Facebook posts
relating to ACTA, despite the overlapping issues at stake. In the EU, ACTA is still being actively
protested by the people. However, the EU has been able to pursue actions under the premises of
ACTA (see the RnBXclusive.com case in Chapter 4), and ACTA avoided being struck down by
the European Parliament when de Gucht moved it to the Court of Justice for a ruling. Moreover,
as Foucault notes, just because the people are complaining does not mean the people are in
control. Foucault’s examples of the confession society outlined in History of Sexuality makes the
converse argument: the more we talk about an issue, the more we freely offer our concerns, the
more information we give the government. The White House petition website, We the People,
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gives the White House exactly this kind of information, with no need for the government to
respond through any direct action (See Chapter 3).
Moreover, these case studies have also shown that governments use freedom of speech
more in terms of surveillance than they do as a safety valve. The common misconception about
the Chinese government’s censorship is that it just silences all dissent of any kind, and only let
out a tiny bit of dissent as a “safety valve” of sorts. If that was true, what would be expected in
the case of the Wenzhou train crash is that the government would automatically cut off all
discourse on the Wenzhou train crash, allowing some discontented posts to leak through, and
then to remove all evidence of these posts as time progresses. Moreover, the government would
not necessarily respond to these complaints in any concrete fashion. Instead, what was observed
in the case of the Wenzhou train crash was that the government allowed for a discourse to
develop on the train crash, then removed certain kinds of extremely inflammatory posts. Most
importantly, the government’s ministers responded directly to safety concerns and the desire for
accountability by creating an investigation team to look into the crash and by firing those in
management positions surrounding the accident. What this response indicates was that the
government was actively watching the comments of the people, through the Fifty Cent Party and
the bureaus designed to watch forum and microblog participation. From this surveillance, the
government was able to construct a response that was sensitive to citizen concerns, allowing the
government to take control of the situation.
In the case of SOPA and ACTA, the Western governments have formally tied themselves
to the surveillance model, allowing and encouraging all citizen comments but watching the
discourse with intense scrutiny. This allowance for freedom of speech also encourages citizens to
give the US and EU governments every opinion they have concerning SOPA and ACTA. As
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such, the US Congress was able to deduce quickly that SOPA would cost congressmen and
women their re-election if they voted to pass it. Thus, since the bill lost support it was removed
from the floor. The White House government, through We the People, was also able to endorse
its argument for preventing copyright infringement, and in the meantime, it continues to endorse
ACTA.
In the EU, the people are similarly perturbed by ACTA’s potential impact on freedom of
speech. The governments of the EU have thus far been able to dismiss fears of this sort by saying
that ACTA will be going up for discussion at the next WTO meeting, thus there will be a
democratic discussion of its principles before it goes into effect. The decision to move ACTA to
the Court of Justice was another method of regaining public support before the publically elected
members of the European Parliament could vote against it. While the EU claims that ACTA is
not currently impacting EU governance, the fact remains that copyright crackdowns have already
begun, as seen in the case of RnBxclusive.com which adhered to ACTA’s principles. This sort of
rhetorical duality is possible because the EU and the US’s surveillance of public opinion through
the Internet allows for subtle manipulations of the discourse, such that the governments can walk
the tightrope between upsetting the citizens of the US and upsetting the corporate lobby in
support of SOPA and ACTA.
The implications of this thesis is that the Internet has become the newest medium through
which governments must control discourse, and thus freedom of speech, in order to have
effective governance in every other facet of the government. Across regime type and geographic
location, this principle of control of discourse aptly describes government relations with the
Internet. It’s not so simple as censorship and free speech; governments have to control discourses,
what is and is not said, in order to maintain power. This basic theoretical model was used by
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Foucault in the 1960s, before the advent of the Internet. After the Internet’s creation, Foucault’s
panopticon from Discipline and Punish explains this surveillance model of governance in society
just as well as it did before the Internet’s inception. Now, however, the governments of the world
are able to use the Internet to penetrate deeper into the daily lives and opinions of their citizens.
Moreover, as Foucault describes in History of Sexuality, the confessional culture created by
governments in the 1800s surrounding sex can aptly describe how these government elicit
commentary from its citizens, in order to respond to claims of poor governance with appropriate
government measures. These political theories from past eras stand true today.
Freedom of speech in the modern era is not “under attack,” however. Rather, freedom of
speech is now and has always been allowed under proviso. This thesis builds on a premise
forgotten by the West: freedom of speech is an ideal, but not completely attainable. Governments
will have secrets and will control discourse by virtue of their power, and do so in the pursuit of
societal and political stability. To have complete freedom of speech would be achievable only
under political conditions of anarchy. Successful governance relies on balancing the need for
secrecy and control with the need to allow citizens to achieve self-determination. In every
country, even China, governance seeks to strike this balance. In the age of the Internet, this is
still the goal for governance. The only change is the speed at which this governance must occur
and the mechanisms developed to manage this balance. It is in the rapidly firing synapses of this
new global network that the future of governance lies, and the speeches and discourse of the
future will be shaped in this new realm of cyberspace.
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